More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical Situatedness

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1. INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger’s perspective stands out among the many proposals for understanding affect in the phenomenological tradition. One reason for this is that Heidegger is the most thorough anti-Cartesian among the phenomenologists. He rigorously disbands affectivity from notions of psychological interiority, inner states, or other individualist allegiances, construing affect instead as a form of being open to the world in a radical sense. Another reason is that Heidegger places affect in the thick of everyday social and interpersonal commerce—within the warp and weft of all our days. With this orientation, he manages to combine a sense for ordinary comportment and experience—a phenomenological and cultural analysis of the everyday—with a profound sense for the ontological depths of human existence. Rarely have the mundane and the metaphysical been so thoroughly co-articulated; and yet Heidegger works from an acute sense of the massive discordance between these two distinct but interwoven layers of existence. Despite this promising outlook, there is much one should take issue with in Heidegger’s work, above all and most strikingly his dubious politics. My way of dealing with this problematic is not the usual one of trying to identify fascist or proto-fascistic tendencies in Heidegger’s philosophy (I made a start at that elsewhere, see Slaby forthcoming). Rather, in the final section of this article, I will indicate how the perspective on affect and historicity developed here might help us turn Heidegger’s insights against his own putative political orientation.

I will mainly focus on two aspects of Heidegger’s view, as these might help orient critical work on affect in philosophy and the humanities today.
I elaborate these points for the most part by way of an exegetical engagement with key passages from *Being and Time*. But ultimately, the position articulated here will be largely independent of Heidegger’s own concerns, that is, fundamental ontology. What matters for the present approach is the clarification of two interrelated points that can inform current work on affect independently of how one stands toward the project of *Being and Time*. The first point concerns the *synchronic situatedness* of affect. On the reading proposed here, affectivity must be construed as the radical situatedness of an agent in their factual surroundings. An important consequence of this is that affectivity cannot be restricted to what is currently felt or otherwise apprehended. The reach of affective disclosure outruns what is consciously registered at a given moment so that there “is” at all times more “in” affectivity than one is presently aware of or actively in touch with. This has consequences for understanding affective intentionality and for addressing questions as to the appropriateness of affective comportment, which points to the more general issue of the normativity pertaining to affect. Second, this affective situatedness crucially encompasses temporality. It is a situatedness in time, a diachronic situatedness that crucially reigns over synchronic situatedness. More than that, what affectivity gets us in touch with is the *concrete past*—lived, ongoing history—insofar as this past continues to weigh on and sets the stage for present and future comportment. Against the prioritizing of the present in many approaches to affect, Heidegger helps us appreciate the massive extent to which affect is, almost literally, a thing of the past. Affect is a central conduit for how the past prevails within the texture of the present—for how it comes to matter again and again in ongoing comportment.

The article is structured as follows. I begin by summarizing the gist of Heidegger’s approach to affectivity, focusing on the term *Befindlichkeit* and its translations into English (Section 2). Next, I elucidate what Heidegger means by “thrownness,” suggesting an understanding in terms of radical situatedness (Section 3). Then I discuss Katherine Withy’s concept of “disclosive posture,” as it can help appreciate the sense in which affect encompasses both, a type of comportment (*posture*) and a way of being in touch with the world that radically outstrips any sense of cognitive grasp, representational uptake, or consensual sense-making (*disclosure*) (Section 4). In the last two sections, I deal with the temporal dimension of affectivity, first by revisiting some key themes from Division II of *Being and Time* (Section 5), and then, in closing, by suggesting ways to move forward with forms of affect and emotion research that are mindful of the past’s continuous weighing on the present (Section 6).

### 2. AFFECTIVITY AS FINDINGNESS

John Haugeland, famous for slogans rendering complex philosophical points graspable, once condensed Heidegger’s understanding of affect into a catch phrase:
Well, I guess we’ll just have to go on from here. (Haugeland 2013, 234)

This sigh presents the upshot of Heideggerian affectivity right out of the hassle of everyday life. It captures the oft-recurring moment where it dawns on one that, alas, this is how things stand at this point, this is the base from which we will have to go on, whether we like it or not. It simultaneously expresses a sense of a factual situatedness (“from here”), of an inevitability (“we have to…”) and a futural orientation (“…go on”). But right beneath the grammatical surface lurks a relation to the past: What we have to go on from, at present, is what has come to be, what has happened up to this point so that we ended up where we’re currently at. This facticity (fact—that which has been made) is the temporal mainstay of affectivity, the way affect makes manifest and holds active what has come to pass thus far. This aspect is crucial for understanding what Heidegger is driving at with his approach to affectivity: a radical situatedness within an ongoing, formative history that sets the stage for everything that will unfold from now on.

Unpacked like this, Haugeland’s slogan helps make sense of Heidegger’s choice of the term Befindlichkeit—a somewhat old-fashioned, slightly posh-sounding German word that Heidegger molded into form for his purposes. In its literal meaning, sich befinden means “being somewhere,” that is, situatedness, while its colloquial meaning refers to one’s overall situation in an evaluative sense, how one is currently faring in the world—the condition that answers to the question “how it is going for one.” Befinden can even directly express an evaluative judgment (“etwas für gut befinden”—to deem something good), which hints at the evaluative character of the situatedness in question. Affective situatedness would thus come with a sense for whether things are going well or poorly. In light of this, Haugeland’s suggested translation of Befindlichkeit as “sofindingness” was not off the mark, despite its morphological crankiness (Haugeland 2013, 196; 2000, 54). Hubert Dreyfus’s suggestion “where we’re at-ness” likewise odd-sounding, is also to the point (Dreyfus 1991, 168). In a slightly different key, a case might be made for “disposedness” as a less literal rendition (Blattner 2006), associating affectivity with one’s being concretely arranged, set up, and “placed” (i.e., dis-ponere). This is a semantic field that resonates with the idea of situatedness that the present analysis tries to bring out. Eventually, “findingness” has come to be the term of choice among most scholars, and that is also what I settle for here.

Another translation of Befindlichkeit that has gained traction is “attunement.” It seems adequate as well, on the condition that one appreciates an important distinction in Heidegger’s approach. Attunement works in a different key than findingness; it is apt for speaking of the concrete way in which a particular instance of findingness unfolds, the process of “feeling out” one’s situation, one’s tuning in to one’s surroundings. These two terms—“findingness” and “attunement”—correspond to a key duality implicit in the account of Befindlichkeit. “Findingness” refers to the ontological condition of affectivity, whereas “attunement” refers to the ontic concretions, that is, the particular instances of affectivity in which the overall condition manifests in different ways.
When Heidegger introduces *Befindlichkeit* in division one of *Being and Time* (§ 29 and 30), he does so in the context of his analysis of being-in-the-world as one of the three equiprimordial modes of being-in (*In-sein als solches*). Given this, one might tentatively gloss it as a ground floor dimension of *intentionality*, even though Heidegger himself was averse to the idiom of intentionality for systematic reasons (he thought it was hopelessly infested by Cartesianism). Yet, findingness must definitely be thought of as a dimension of world-relatedness in general. It is the passive-receptive dimension of dasein’s “openness to the world” (SZ, 137)—inextricable from and on the same footing as its active (*Verstehen*) and discursive (*Rede*) dimensions. As such, affectivity sets the stage for the concrete *directedness towards*... characteristic of intentionality as usually understood: “The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself toward something” (SZ, 137; italics in original).

Thus, Heidegger’s approach to affect brings the whole architecture of human world-directedness into focus, the situated interplay of world- and self-disclosure in evaluative terms and with regard to its practical ramifications within the articulated whole of existence. Affect is disbanded from a narrow perspective of feelings or emotions as mental states and expanded into the whole of individual and collective world-relatedness, or, in Heidegger’s parlance, being-in-the-world—what I propose to gloss as “radical situatedness.” Affect is a matter of encompassing *existential orientations*—of “ways of finding oneself in the world” (Ratcliffe 2013). That is part of why Heidegger’s work is of such importance to the philosophy of emotion—while it is at the same time capable of widening the purview of philosophical treatments of affect and emotion so as to also cover other dimensions of world- and self-relatedness, such as understanding, practical comportment, and social interaction.

1. As is common in Heidegger scholarship, when citing from *Being and Time* I refer to the page numbers of the German edition of *Sein und Zeit* (abbreviated as SZ) published in 1927 by Niemeyer. My English translations are based on the edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, but I have taken the liberty to modify their rendition where I found it appropriate (Heidegger [1927] 1962).

2. Given this, there is no pure affectivity on Heidegger’s account. As a constitutive dimension of being-in, findingness is enmeshed with its other constitutive modes, *understanding* and *discourse*, and this pertains to every particular instance of it, down to their nuances: “Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement is one in which one understands. ... The understanding which has its mood ... articulates itself with relation to its intelligibility in discourse” (SZ, 335, translation modified). Affectivity pervades a person’s entire situated existence, as its passive-receptive dimension yet not neatly separable from forms of active engagement (cf. Slaby and Wüschner 2014).

3. The phenomenologist Matthew Ratcliffe is at the forefront of present-day scholars of affect who have taken inspiration from Heidegger on findingness. With his concept of *existential feelings* (Ratcliffe 2008), he has inspired much productive recent work on background affectivity and affective situatedness. For a recent reconstructive and critical engagement with Heidegger’s approach, I recommend the joint work of Freeman and Elpidorou (see Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; Freeman & Elpidorou 2015).
3. THROWNNESS AS RADICAL SITUATEDNESS

The systematic distinction that governs Heidegger’s philosophy is the distinction between being and entities, Sein and Seiendes—the ontological difference. Heidegger’s critical point against the philosophical tradition is that while philosophy is strictly in the business of investigating being, it has for the most part occupied itself merely with entities, and, what is worse, has treated being itself as just another entity (cf. Haugeland 2013). This forgetfulness of being is not philosophy’s fault alone, as it rather testifies to a pervasive condition of human existence in general. It is a structural self-misunderstanding build into all mundane self-relations—namely, the tendency to understand oneself in terms of the modes of being of the things and the stuff that one routinely deals with in everyday comportment, a kind of default self-objectification. This wide-ranging misunderstanding also governs affectivity, which oscillates between routine modes of self-intransparency and rare moments of existential clarity.

When it comes to affectivity, the ontological difference manifests as the difference between the overall existential dimension of Befindlichkeit—findingness—and the various particular moods, emotions and other modes of affective comportment that are its ontic concretions—what we chose to call modes of attunement. Accordingly, when dealing with affectivity, it is important to not gratuitously mix up ontological claims about findingness with ontic claims about its specific manifestations. Yet, in practice, this distinction cannot be sharply drawn. The ontological is not a separate dimension behind or beneath the ontic, as being is the being of entities, so we can get at being only through studying entities (which means in this case specific modes of comportment). There are only concrete moods and emotions, so what is true about findingness as an ontological condition must be revealed through a thorough phenomenological analysis of these.

This cautionary note helps us come to terms with the two sets of claims that Heidegger makes about findingness, those about its ontological (or existential) nature, and those that concern its mundane, everyday manifestations, and it also helps us grasp the peculiar character of the world-relatedness of affectivity. The default self-misunderstanding of dasein manifests in affectivity in such a way that its two dimensions for the most part work against one another. Everyday affective episodes tend to actively occlude the ontological nature of findingness—they disclose, for the most part, “in the manner of an evasive turning-away” (SZ, 136). Yet at the same time, there is something in findingness that will forever haunt and disturb these evasive surfeits of mundane affectivity. Heidegger illustrates this in exemplary manner in his analysis of anxiety in § 40 of Being and Time. For the most part, shallow evasiveness

4. The very first sentence of the crucial § 29 of Being and Time marks this distinction terminologically: “What we indicate ontologically by the term findingness is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing: our mood, our being-attuned” (SZ, 134; translation modified)
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wins the day, for instance when mere fear springs up in place of profound and unsettling anxiety, or analogously—in the case of boredom—when it is experientially overshadowed by all sorts of happy-go-lucky affective engagements. Yet the disclosive depth of findingness lurks right around the corner, ready to burst forth at any moment, as when anxiety suddenly takes hold of us out of the blue, disrupting our comforting absorption in routine activity and leaving us with an eerie sense of being-not-at-home (Unzuhause; cf. SZ, 189). In such rare but decisive moments, existential insights might dawn upon us. This is why Heidegger grants a crucial methodological role to affective predicaments such as anxiety or boredom, as these are capable of an existential disclosure that reaches deeper than what other dimensions of existence might offer to the phenomenologist (cf. Withy 2012).

The key ontological claim that governs the entire discussion is that findingness discloses facticity—what Heidegger memorably designates by the term “thrownness”:

This characteristic of dasein’s being—this ‘that it is’—is veiled in its “whence and whither,” yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the “thrownness” of this being into its “there”; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as being-in-the-world, it is the “there.” The expression “thrownness” is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered-over [die Faktizität der Überantwortung]. (SZ, 135)

Mindful of Haugeland’s slogan, we are prepared to get to the bottom of this. Findingness reveals with daunting inevitability that we are, that we are here as this concrete entity (Seiendes), and by the same stroke that we have to be—that is, “go on from here.” The condition in question requires description in drastic terms because it will not suffice to talk about it with sugarcoated terms such as self-awareness, sense of reality, or feeling of being. It is not a form of awareness at all, as findingness goes together with utter unawareness, with pervasive blindness, evasion, self-distraction, delusion. Facticity is not a mere “characteristic” of human beings, not a property or feature among others, but the unshakable condition of sheer “being there”—dasein’s factual being as this concrete entity amidst these (and no other) circumstances. The term thrownness aptly expresses this rock-solid, unshakable facticity of situatedness. The basic ontological point about affectivity is that this unrelenting facticity of existence manifests in it—or better still: affectivity is this unshakable facticity. However, much in the way of distractions or comforting conceits we may erect in face of this our base predicament, ultimately thrownness sets the tone for our being:

Even if Dasein is “assured” in its belief about its “whither,” or if, in a spirit of rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about its “whence,” all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal fact of the case: for the mood brings Dasein before the “that-it-is” of its “there,” which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma. (SZ, 136, translation modified)
Given this, even well thought-out suggestions to capture the gist of findingness in colloquial terms run in danger of erring on the side of harmlessness. For instance, it does not suffice to speak of affective conditions as “ways of finding oneself in the world” (cf. Ratcliffe 2013). On a superficial descriptive level, this gloss is surely accurate. Yet this phrase fail to capture the full drama of factual situatedness, its “hardness,” its inevitability, the momentousness and sheer monstrosity of what we can in no way shake free of.  

The brute facticity of dasein is “there” in every attunement, but not as a cognitive or perceptual presence, not as a tangible object or theme of awareness. Facticity is indeed right there, pervading everything—after all, it is our very factual being, existence pure and simple. But when it comes to attentive beholding, cognitive access, explicit acknowledgment, facticity is for the most part already blocked out, evaded, we have always already turned away from it. Heidegger’s term Abkehr is well-chosen and must by all means be taken literally. What goes on here is indeed an active turning away from what is—and stays—right there. Through such a maneuver, what is at the forefront of existence is made into a matter of secondary consideration, while this activity of turning-away itself is not acknowledged but routinely disavowed. Thereby, facticity seemingly becomes a fringe matter that merely lurks at the margins of awareness as a shadowy dimension, while in fact it is right there, all the time, unshakable, it is us… So when an intimation of thrownness haunts one’s absorption in routine everyday comportment, it does so not as something that enters from without, but as what assails us right out of the midst of our current dwelling in our situation: “A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being” (SZ, 136).

Like a silent scream of horror in the depths of our being, facticity is what we for the most part will not make clear to ourselves. Still, it is “there” all the time, ready to burst forth at any moment. In certain outstanding instances of our affective lives—anxiety and profound boredom among them—the enigma of situated existence will be lit up and brought into relief. Only then will dasein face up to the “naked there” of its facticity.

So this is what Heidegger means when he says moods disclose, for the most part, in the mode of evasion or turning-away. Moods’ evasiveness pivots exactly on that which it ultimately reveals. In the light of this it is understandable that Heidegger says, of anxiety, that what one is anxious of “pursues” itself.

5. Likewise in danger of missing out on the radicalness of thrownness are glosses such as that thrownness just means something like “starting point” or the fact that a human life always already has some content, that something is always already up with one, and so on. Withy (2014), in her thorough interpretation of thrownness in terms of finitude and self-obscurity, rejects various of those shallow proposals.

6. Accordingly, one might say of thrownness/findingness the same as Heidegger says of dasein: “Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest” (SZ, 15).
dasein in the very act of one’s fleeing it (cf. SZ, 184). Likewise, with regard to profound boredom, his point is that, ultimately, the entirety of existence is pervaded by it, nearly all the time (cf. Heidegger [1929–1930] 2008, 29–30).

Heideggerian affect is more than a feeling; it is a condition of situatedness that outruns and overspills experience, mental states, acts of comportment, or momentary states of upheaval in all manner of ways. It is a situatedness so radical and merciless that it blinds us to ourselves in the same stroke by which it inevitably reveals, in the most profound way, that we are, what we are, and where we’re at. There is no way around it: We have to go on from here.

With this, we can now leave the general discussion of Befindlichkeit and approach the more concrete issue of developing a philosophical approach of affective world-disclosure on these grounds.

4. DISCLOSIVE POSTURES

How to best elaborate the type of “condition” that is findingness in concrete human existence? We need to get clear on the comportment type that spans the interval between factical situatedness and the potential for authentic insight and awareness we are capable of with regard to it. The aim of this section is to come to terms with how affectivity can be explicated as a dimension of practical world-disclosure. The question is how we might stay true to the insights of Heidegger’s existential analytic while moving closer to a plane where central issues of the philosophy of emotion are debated; for example, themes such as affective intentionality and affective self-consciousness (cf., e.g., Slaby and Stephan 2008).

Katherine Withy has done important groundwork in this regard. In particular, she has introduced the concept “disclosive posture” to characterize the comportment type, as I would call it, that is proper to Heideggerian affectivity (cf. Withy 2015). The concept sheds light on the peculiar zone of overlap between the brute, factual situatedness (thrownness) and the sense of potential ownedness—self-possession and self-awareness—that characterizes real-life affective comportment. It answers to the question of how to “adequately” deal with thrownness. What can be demanded of a subject in face of this unrelenting existential condition? In spelling out her proposal, Withy realigns Heidegger’s approach to findingness with some of its sources in the work of Aristotle, especially with concepts such as pathé, hexis, diathesis, and prohairesis, among others (cf. Heidegger [1924] 2009). She echoes several of the points I have made above when motivating the choice of the term “disclosive posture”:

Understanding the pathé in terms of judgments misses the same thing that understanding them as bodily feelings or conditions of the soul does—namely, that the pathé are ways in which we are out and about in the world, immersed and involved in our situation. To capture this, Heidegger needs a model other than that of a subject knowing an object. He uses the model of standing in a situation. On this model, the pathé are what I will call “disclosive postures”. They are ways of finding
ourselves situated, where this means both that they are ways of finding
ourselves and our situation (i.e. that they are findingly disclosive) and
that they are ways of being situated in the world (i.e. postures). This
understanding of the *pathê* accommodates all intentional affective phe-
nomena, including moods and emotions. (Withy 2015, 23)

What matters for present purposes is the kind of relatedness or positionality
denoted by the term “posture”: standing in a situation, finding oneself situated,
constellated into worldly circumstances, being “out and about” in the world,
immersed in it—instead of experiencing or representing, let alone issuing a
detached judgment on one’s surroundings. Affectivity does not relate an agent
to their world by way of mental representations, experiences or inner states
of other kinds, but in the form of a wholesale *positioning* or *orientation* (*Ausrichtung*) of their embodied being in relation to—alignment or misalign-
ment—the current surroundings. The term *posture* refers to a person’s “stance”
or “stand,” and it is clear from much of what Heidegger writes about finding-
ness that this is to be understood as the various modes or ways of aligning
with—being a part of and constellated into, “rolling with,” making sense of—a
local tangle of people and things in its particular dynamics and tendency.

In view of this, it is no accident that Heidegger’s favored term for con-
crete episodes of affective comportment is indeed *Stimmung* (mood)—rather
than the more common terms *Emotion* or *Gefühl* (feeling). The word *Stimmung*,
considered in its original meaning, does not refer to a state of feeling or a
psychic condition of another kind. Rather, *Stimmung* originally means align-
ment, arrangement, or attunement. The origin of the concept points back to
the activity of tuning musical instruments—bringing them to the “right” condi-
tion; arranging, modifying them such that they will be ready for play. In light
of this time-honored human practice, it becomes clear why “attunement” is
an apt English term for condensing what Heidegger envisions affective episodes
to be like. Just like a musical instrument, a person might be “in tune” or
“out of tune” with their surroundings, aligned or misaligned, in consonance
or dissonance, and thus disposed properly or improperly given the situation
at hand. Only at a much later stage did the term *Stimmung* become the
canonical German term for “mood,” with its connotations increasingly settling
on notions of harmony in the sense of “being in tune with” or “properly
sounding,” “well-ordered” (cf. Wellbery 2003). In Heidegger’s adoption, *Stimmung*
and findingness in general are no longer tied to ideas of conventional harmony
or harmonious coordination. Instead, these terms encompass also states of
disarray (*Verstimmung*). Heideggerian affectivity, findingness, thus spans both,
relatively ordered ways of being *oriented* (composed, in control) and ways of
being utterly *disoriented* (confused, dispersed, out of tune) in or with one’s
ambience. Withy builds on this with her concept of a posture: Instead of
merely *finding oneself* in or out of tune with the world, “posture” articulates
the sense in which one may actively modify, inhabit, or “live” one’s situated-
ness—transitioning from passive affectedness into a broad spectrum of more
active forms of engagement (cf. also Slaby and Wüschner 2014).
What about the second term of the composite “disclosive posture”—disclosure? As noted above, disclosure is Heidegger’s term of art for dasein’s openness to the world in the sense of both the potential and the requirement to become accurately, truthfully oriented in it. Thus, disclosure substitutes for terms such as knowledge or cognition as these are too narrow, too mentalistic, too much beholden to Cartesian, post-Kantian or empiricist understandings of human world-relatedness. Disclosure is Heidegger’s title for the dimension in which understanding or misunderstanding, awareness or unawareness, intelligibility and unintelligibility are so much as possible. Disclosure names the entire dimension of a person’s potential openness to the world, including the potential openness to what is in fact occluded, and also the openness to what is “there” but nevertheless way beyond one’s grasp. This is crucial for coming to terms with thrownness, the condition that, while it is the inevitable baseline of dasein’s factual existence, tends to get evaded and disavowed so thoroughly. “Disclosure” helps to focus on this peculiar interval between what is factually “there,” and thus within the reach of potential awareness, and what is already grasped, acknowledged and interpreted (but, not infrequently, thereby domesticated or trivialized). It is between these existential poles that affective world-relatedness unfolds as an interplay between occlusion and revelation of a factual situation.

Putting it this way suggests that the concept of disclosure must be understood normatively. “Being disclosed”—existing in the mode of thrown projection—means that one is not just capable but also under the obligation to become aware of oneself and one’s situation. Dasein, although in fact beset by swathes of confusion, and notoriously prone to evasive maneuvers of all sorts, is nevertheless called upon to disclose properly, on pain of losing its overall intelligibility. What is at stake is not just the viability of this or that worldly project or practice, but ultimately the sustainability of the entire life form, the sheer possibility to make sense, to engage in any sort of meaningful project at all. That is, ultimately at stake is the possibility of dasein as such. In the last instance, a failure to disclose properly pushes the entirety of sense and sense-making to the brink, and it is this essential fragility or precariousness of sense-making—what Heidegger calls an “understanding of being”—that is the source of the normativity of world disclosure. Existentially, this normativity is revealed in the condition of angst, or relatedly in the call of conscience; both modes of attunement which unsettle dasein’s absorption in routine distractions, and call it back into facing up to the situation at hand, so as to act resolutely on behalf the ultimate possibility to make any kind of sense at all.7

7. The intricacies of this issue are not explicitly discussed by Withy in her 2015 article because she places her discussion of disclosive posture within the context of Aristotle’s inquiry into human excellence in the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, it is beyond debate that human individuals are subject to normative assessment in light of communal standards. The complicated normative backdrop of Being and Time, which is the central yet somewhat concealed theme of Division II, is a paramount topic of Haugeland’s interpretive efforts (see Haugeland 2013; cf. Schear 2013).
The overall picture of affective disclosure then goes as follows. Affective comportment is one’s *being constellated in* and *attuned to* the world in such a way that one is *potentially* aware and knowledgeable about it, yet inevitably falling short of an encompassing awareness of where one is at. This potential closed-off-ness enabled by disclosure does not only pertain to the ways in which averageness or idle talk cloud one’s senses. It applies to the condition that we’re at all times situated in constellations that we cannot oversee and understand. There is always more going on with and around us than we can get a handle on—yet this “more” which goes on is a dimension of our affectivity, it is our situation, it is what we cannot *not* deal with in living our lives. Even if we block it from awareness constantly, it is nevertheless right there, creeping up on us time and again.

Given the expanse of factual situatedness—which is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic—the demand to become self-aware, to achieve an understanding stance on one’s situation, can only be understood as an infinite task; a task whose fulfillment one can at best aspire to and strive for. The disclosive *reach* of affectivity exceeds its *grasp*; nonetheless, as persons, we operate under a normative demand to get clear, and ever *more clear* on our situation, by finding, accommodating, maintaining, elaborating sense.8 We have to deal with the fact that we are situated in a world that does not end at the margins of our awareness; our spheres of intelligibility are not sealed off and magically isolated from the as yet “senseless” expanse that lies beyond. With his notion of disclosure, Heidegger gets at this “always more” of situatedness (thrownness) and this “always less” of understanding (intelligibility). This means that we are *always* and *necessarily* affectively attuned to and constellated into what we do not fully grasp. We are thrown and thus factually affected by more than we can make sense of, no matter how much of a worked-out command of our situation we have managed to achieve. We are “in it” way up above our heads, implicated in so much more than we can absorb, process, and meaningfully deal with. The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways. This diffuse realm “beyond sense” renders all that is established fragile, haunts all routines, and instills anxiety and unsettledness. This is what disclosive postures both reveal and answer to.

Putting it in these terms might seem to place the emphasis on those instances of affectivity where a person has already reached a half-way composed orientation—in Aristotle’s terms, a *hexis* as opposed to full-blown *pathé*

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8. This formulation is adapted from Rouse (2002, 25), who applies it to the normativity of human situatedness both more generally and in a specific context of a normative practice theory: “Our normative reach always exceeds our grasp, and hence what is at stake in practices outruns any present articulation of those stakes.” For more on Rouse’s overall perspective, which jibes well with the one developed here, see also his more recent work (e.g., Rouse 2015).
(where the latter will throw us into disarray, at least initially, let one lose composure so that a posture first needs to be regained). This is the main orientation of Withy’s work. She foregrounds the drive toward responsible positioning (taking a stand) amidst turmoil. We have to be careful not to turn this into a means to straighten out the unruliness, the wildness, the sheer inexorability of factual situatedness, the way in which situatedness overwhelms and outruns what an individual musters and commands, how it exceeds what is consensually “livable.” The point of the discussion is exactly that the individual subject is not an unproblematic locus of command and control, nor one where order or self-possession have much of a foothold.

What is crucial is the more general direction that Withy has chosen. Her perspective on findingness takes us right into the thick of the situatedness of affectivity. On her perspective, affectivity simply is the situatedness of finite, sense-making beings within encompassing worldly constellations, past and present. On Withy’s view, “becoming affective” means finding oneself constellated into an ongoing situation that matters. One can see here how the advanced phenomenological perspective on affect that Heidegger inspires balances the intuition of situatedness, even radical situatedness of affect, with a sense in which the individual agent remains the responsible addressee of normative demands. Being a person, existing findingly, brings with it the responsibility of getting clear on what goes on. It requires one to take a stand on one’s factual situation, on pain of losing the intelligibility of one’s forms of life and one’s ways of being—while at the same time acknowledging and accommodating that this is an infinite, never-to-be-completed task. Enacting such a posture without evasion and self-delusion amounts to living up, gracefully, to the essential finitude of existence. 10

5. IT’S ABOUT TIME: AFFECTIVITY AND TEMPORALITY

We are now in a position to render the relationship of affectivity and temporality explicit. To set the stage for this, a brief reminder of the central role that temporality occupies in Heidegger’s existential analytic is in order.

In Division II of Being and Time, Heidegger re-interprets the care-structure that constitutes being-in-the-world in terms of temporality. Care as the coordinated interplay of understanding as projection (being-ahead…), findingness as thrownness (already-in) and falling (as being-amidst) is now revealed as the articulated

9. Withy distinguishes three “formats” of the passions in Heidegger and Aristotle, namely specific capacity, instance of affectedness and posture or hexis (Withy 2015, 22). I cannot go into detail about Aristotle’s intriguing concept of hexis and its intellectual afterlife. I have learned a lot from Philipp Wüschner’s (2016) thoughtful study that charts much of this terrain.

10. The extent to which Being and Time in general is a meditation on finitude has been a key preoccupation of Haugeland’s work (see, notably, Haugeland 2000). More recently, Joseph K. Schear (2013) has provided a superbly informed take on this theme with many resonances to the points developed here. Withy (2014) interprets thrownness convincingly as another name for the essential finitude of dasein.
interplay of the three temporal dimensions future, past, and present. Or, expressed in the proper existential vernacular: futurity (Zukunft), beeness (Gewesenheit), and enpresenting (Gegenwärtigen). These must not be equated with ordinary notions of time as linear sequence of self-same moments running on *ad infinitum*. Rather, existential temporality is finite—“completed” in each case by death—and therefore futurity has a priority over the other dimensions. The pressing-ahead into possibilities-to-be, characteristic of futural coming-toward, orients the overall temporal dynamic, culminating in death as the ownmost, exceptionally outstanding, non-relational and thus ultimate possibility of dasein (Mulhall 2005; cf. Slaby 2015). The dynamic, finite unity of the three dimensions as being-toward-death thereby constitutes the unity of the self, a fragile connectedness of findingness, understanding, and absorption played out, in each case of dasein, as its own specific drama. The being of dasein unfolds ecstatically as an interplay of three temporal “moments,” coming-toward (future), having-been (past), and enpresenting (present).

This is not the place to relate the full story of the temporal interpretation of dasein—a matter of much debate and scholarly effort (see, e.g., Blattner 2006; Käufer 2013; Schear 2013; Slaby 2015). Instead, I will now close in on the temporal character of affectivity and deal with this exclusively in the remainder of this article.

As indicated previously, while understanding as projection (*Entwurf*) manifests futurity (being-ahead…), findingness as thrownness foregrounds the past: having-been (Gewesenheit in German). In becoming affected, factual being—what we have come to be and thus have no choice but to go on from—is rendered salient. This is, at long last, the temporal sense of thrownness: Affective involvement is a way of being bound; in it, we are tied back to facticity as that which grounds, constrains, and enables our possibilities for going on with our form of life. Affectivity “highlights,” in all sorts of ways, this existential boundedness by and groundedness into what is—what has come to be so that it is now there, like it or not. In this way, the past weighs on us. Facticity manifests as the burdensome drag that grounds all potential ways and efforts of going on. This is the sense in which we should indeed speak of a temporal situatedness of affectivity. What gets revealed here is that affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.

At this point, one should call to mind a central operation of Division I of *Being and Time* in order to grasp the key implication of this all. As being-in-the-world, dasein is its situatedness. Dasein is not set over against the world as a separate dimension, it is not “directed” at the world or cognitively apprehending it from a distance, but it is in and of the world, enmeshed and entangled with it. No matter whether it is presently open to the world or closed off from it, it is definitely inseparable from it. Applied to the issue of temporality, this means that there is no ontological cut between beeness, as a dimension of existence, and history, as the unfolding of historical events. Just as thrownness is both the concrete thrownness of dasein and the thrownness into the world, temporality manifests as inextricably *my* time, in findingness, and as history, that is, as that
“in” and “as” which temporality as such unfolds. Thus, we are warranted to make the transition from beenness to history. Dasein’s temporality is being in history, that is, historical existence. Existential temporality and world history are the two sides of the same dynamic, dasein is “geschichtlich” (cf. SZ, 388–89).11

Accordingly, we can conclude that, indeed, concrete, ongoing history sets the stage for our present and future being—a history that is, in each single case, “ours,” yet not separate from worldly affairs at large. It is ours in a double sense: On the one hand, as we have seen, we are inextricably entwined with history, we’re of it, it runs through us. Concrete history is the “heritage” that shapes, orients, and enables us. But that does not mean that we have in each case appropriated, acknowledged, or faced up to it. Here again, the double bind of thrownness becomes evident. What has come to be intelligibly formatted into a codified heritage (or “tradition”) is at all times engulfed by an inexorable outside beyond the purview of present articulation.12 Thrownness is “into” this factual “there” which goes way beyond what gets officially narrated, curated, instituted. History includes this encompassing setting, even if it is routinely discarded and kept out of official records. History, as a dimension of thrownness, includes the grand outside to that which has already been made intelligible. As such, it is always also there within or around the very meaning structures of the everyday, mercilessly staring us in the face, haunting us, threatening the homely and familiar with breakdown and chaos.

Put differently, those strands of recorded history that we have taken a stand on are a limited fragment in face of the sweeping currents of history into which we are thrown. Yet it is always possible to expand or revise our stance, to own up to other or more segments of the formative past, to shoulder the burden of factual history resolutely, by holding ourselves open to what else is out there, weighing on us, setting the stage for what will unfold from now on. The notion of “disclosive posture” helps to stabilize this point, as it invokes the potential for a graceful positioning, for a circumspect alertness amidst what we do not oversee or grasp, a readiness to let oneself be carried further toward what is there to be known about one’s situation, one’s history and, thereby, about the world at large.13 Yet, no matter whether we acknowledge it or not, face up to it or not, take a committed stand on it or not—the past is there, merciless, like a hand on our shoulder, a weight dragging us down, the stage and props of our life’s unfolding drama.

11. Heidegger develops these points in the dense § 74 and § 75 of Being and Time; see especially SZ, 384–89.

12. Again, we can say, with Rouse (2002), that this “outside” lies beyond the (actual) grasp but not beyond the (possible) reach of articulation.

13. For instance, that might include striving to get to know and bring to light repressed or concealed stories and narratives that simmer beneath the surface of what is officially related about the past. It could be a stance of probing and shaking the official narrative texture of the everyday, on the lookout for the untold and the blocked-out, a restless impatience with—and pushing beyond—paramount frames of reality.
All these formulations are mere variations on the condition of thrownness. Unsurprisingly, Heidegger himself glosses the basic temporal signature of findingness also explicitly in terms of thrownness, by placing his emphasis on that which dasein is thrown “into,” providing us with another gloss on radical situatedness:

The schema within which dasein is disclosed to itself in findingness as thrown is to be taken as that in-the-face-of-which it is thrown (Wovor der Geworfenheit) and that to which it has been abandoned (Woran der Überlassenheit). This characterizes the horizontal schema of what has been. (SZ, 365, translation modified)

This helps us formulate the decisive thought once again in clearer terms. By manifesting the horizon of beenness, findingness discloses the region in which we have been dwelling thus far (i.e., it reveals the “already in...” of existence), the region “in which” we (can’t help but) find ourselves. Interestingly, Heidegger speaks of the region of thrownness also simply as “the world,” taking up the term he had developed at great length in Division I. But now, “world” is used differently, and only now does this term receive its full meaning. No longer does “world” stand for just the sphere of what is already intelligible, the homely realm of consensual meaningfulness disclosed in routine comportment. Instead, the world is now revealed as the full correlate of thrownness. It is indeed “all” of what is and has been ever factually there. In light of this, the familiar philosophical notion of a constituted object fails to characterize it. The world’s “realness” outruns the notion of objectivity as usually understood in post-Kantian philosophy. More radical terms are required to capture the brute facticity of what we are thrown into. “The world is, as it were, already ‘further outside’ than any object can ever be” (SZ, 365).

Ultimately, however, Heidegger himself wavers noticeably on these points, and it is not surprising that he later declared the project of Being and Time a failure. At several points Heidegger seems to shy away from facing up to the full implications of thrownness, namely that it reaches way beyond the ambit of dasein and “existence,” that it even seems to catapult dasein back almost into the sheer categorical mode of being, exposing it as a thing among things, little more than a piece of driftwood washed up at the shore of time. For the most part in Being and Time, Heidegger leaves the “world,” “history” (as tradition), “findingness,” and so on too readily under the scope of dasein and its intelligibility-yielding comportment, its organized practices and ways of life. On this view, resolute being-toward-death might seem to be little more than the crisis mode of otherwise well-composed, committed individuals.14 The danger of subjectivism and idealism is not confronted rigorously

14. There is a tendency especially among Anglo-American scholars of Heidegger to have their interpretations gravitate toward a crypto-Protestant ethics of committed existence. Instead of critically surpassing the subjectivism of Western modernity and fostering a sense for the radical contingency of historical being, these approaches tend to circle back into a relatively moderate, at times even conservative outlook of an existentially dressed-up Kantianism. Haugeland (2013) is not altogether free of this tendency, neither is Crowell (2015).
enough, all of Heidegger’s declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. Thrownness and findingness might be examples of those rare philosophical concepts that outrun and explode the perspective of the very thinker that has invented them.

6. OUTLOOK: HOW TO GO ON FROM HERE?

What conclusions to draw from the preceding discussion? What follows concretely for the philosophy of emotion and for other strands of affect research in the humanities? The somewhat kitschy slogan “more than a feeling” provides a good hint. It is key to widen the purview of affect and emotion research to have it encompass ever wider swathes of the ambient of those whose affectivity is under study. The Heidegger-inspired perspective developed here provides ample enforcement for the situated affectivity movement that has gained much currency in recent years (e.g., Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino 2009; Krueger and Szanto 2016; Stephan, Wilutzky, and Walter 2014). However, the view outlined here is more radical with regard to situatedness than most proposals in this trend. It is indeed a view on the situatedness of finite sense-making beings in general, not merely a view focusing on the socio-material embeddedness of previously identified affective states. Also, the emphasis on temporal situatedness contrasts with the majority of existing proposals, which restrict their scope mostly to synchronic situatedness and fail to display much of a historical sensibility.15

In place of the usual inside-out direction of questioning in this established strand of work—that is, asking of pre-identified affective episodes how they might be embedded in a wider ambient—the view proposed here rather works from the outside-in. It asks how the synchronic and diachronic situatedness of sense-making beings registers either in what is felt (affectionately experienced etc.) or what remains unfelt, and in what ways exactly. How does history concretely manifest and weigh on individuals and collectives, how is historicity “lived,” instituted, orchestrated, avowed and disavowed, embraced or evaded, articulated or disarticulated, brought in view or rather expelled from paramount framings of reality? How is history felt—or conspicuously failed to be felt? Of course, on this perspective, actual modes of affective comportment might still assume a salient position as objects of inquiry, but they will no longer be the sole focus of research. There is so much more going on with us, around us and historically before us than we register by way of readily identifiable affective experiences. Ultimately, the concept of findingness with its transindividual, nonmentalistic, and thoroughly historico-temporal purview might replace the term “affectivity” outright, so as to emphasize this broadened perspective also terminologically.

But this is not all. The view developed here provides a starting point for expressly critical perspectives on historical situatedness. What is so far unfelt

15. The seminal article by Griffiths and Scarantino (2009) is a partial exception, as they introduced the helpful notion of diachronic scaffolding.
yet manifestly “there” is usually that which should be felt or otherwise taken notice of—on pain of ignorance and neglect. At issue might be forms of ignorance complicit with structures of oppression, systematically withheld recognition, or far-reaching systems of injustice (cf. Mills 1997; Sullivan and Tuana 2007).

Here are some instances of the conspicuously unfelt that call for critical analysis. Consider the way in which established presentations of reality—for instance in the practices of mainstream media and in dominant political discourse—contribute to an implicit, unacknowledged framing of human lives as proper targets of emotions such as grief, empathy, regret or shame. As Judith Butler has argued, victims on the putative “other side” in a violent conflict tend to be placed outside the official frame of grievability, so that their death, injury, or misery fails to conjure sympathy or concern. Butler’s (2009) analysis of the “frames of war” can count as an object lesson in studying what remains conspicuously unfelt in the context of violent conflict. Her perspective encompasses the shadowy zones outside officially licensed, ritualized, mediately celebrated public affectivity. Here, affect research proceeds by way of a critical interrogation of socio political reality, confronting what is presumably felt—as it is widely staged and celebrated as such—with what likely remains unfelt as it has no place in discourse and public representations. Such work expands the reach of analysis toward the disavowed “outside”; an outside that nevertheless tends to disturb and haunt the official frames.

In a slightly different key, one might think here of phenomenological work on the way that institutions distribute comfort, homeliness, and entitlement differentially among those who enter their spaces (Ahmed 2007). Consider how members of dominant groups get to navigate seamlessly and undisturbed through legal, governmental, or educational institutions, while members of minority populations are often at risk to be slowed down, probed, viewed with suspicion, greeted with skepticism or outright hostility, so that their path through institutional spaces is often cumbersome, full of obstacles, potentially leading to insecurity, anxiety, and discomfort. From the point of view of those in positions of entitlement, most of this remains unfelt and thus likely unacknowledged. Consider what Sara Ahmed writes about what she calls “institutions of whiteness”:

Whiteness is invisible and unremarked, as the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation. To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins. ... White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape. (Ahmed 2007, 156, 158)

Again, this is a case where so much more is “in” the situation than what is readily experienced or felt on the part of those whose experiences count as

16. Lauren Freeman (2015) has provided a valuable Heidegger-inspired approach to the experiential ramifications of living in a system of racial oppression; I also learned a lot from Alia Al-Saji’s (2013) considerations on racialized time.
majoritarian. Institutions codify and sediment the past so that it can be differentially re-enacted in their subsequent operations. Focusing solely on what is manifestly experienced, let alone only by those who belong to a normative majority, would miss much of what is of critical relevance in the study of institutions.

Continuing in this vein, one might generally consider how thrownness is more saliently and painfully evident to individuals and groups in nondominant positions than it is to those who inhabit spheres of privilege. Work on the afterlife of transatlantic slavery is a case in point. Living “in the wake” (Sharpe 2016) of chattel slavery amounts to inhabiting fundamentally different experiential and affective worlds, depending on one’s heritage. Wake work—as Christina Sharpe calls it with a wonderfully apt turn of phrase—consists in bringing to awareness how a violent past continues to weigh on in the texture of the present. Wake work, while it encompasses much more than just this, includes the effort of turning into speech what is all too often glossed over in silence: unequal living conditions and life chances, mortality rates, unequal distribution of esteem and recognition, and forms of everyday experience, suffering and sheer being that are often discarded or blocked out from dominant perspectives.

Being, staying in the wake, living it: It is a way of gaining and then resolutely enacting a posture—a stance of unmitigated wakefulness, alertness, and critical wisdom with regard to one’s ongoing history; a way to carry the burden of the past, facing up to it, and carrying on with it, in spite of it. Such work can inspire forms of study that reckon with the radical situatedness of affect, with its historicity and worldliness.17

Of course, these are all too brief snapshots on what needs to be elaborated in much more detail. What is crucial as an orientation for affect and emotion research is that the revelation of unacknowledged dimensions of historical being can put pressure on paramount reality, calling into question the viability—even the sheer possibility (in an ethico-existential sense of the term)—of currently prevalent forms of life and their affective textures. Historically oriented critical affect research can thus be a corrective for potentially narrow, often exclusionary, repressive and—willfully or inadvertently—ignorant formations of officially instituted social and political reality. At stake, ultimately, is the development and cultivation of an expansive historical consciousness, a responsible, graceful, and ethically aware positioning amidst the sweeping contingencies of ongoing history.18

17. Besides Sharpe’s gripping study I have found Lose Your Mother by the historian Saidiya Hartman (2007) highly illuminating in this regard.

18. Work on this article has been conducted within the subproject B05 of the Collaborative Research Center 1171 Affective Societies at Freie Universität Berlin, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), 2015-2019. I thank Marie Wuth for her careful reading of the penultimate draft, and for some crucial hints for improving the article. I also thank Philipp Wüschner and Thomas Szanto for discussions on several of the themes covered here.
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