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Abstract	<p>Heidegger's conception of affectivity, as developed for the most part in <i>Being and Time</i>, is reconstructed here with an emphasis on the temporal character of affectivity. While a good number of philosophers of emotion have borrowed from Heidegger's approach, few have so far taken the temporal character of <i>findingness</i> [<i>Befindlichkeit</i>] into account. This paper has three main parts. The first part revisits the standard reading of Heideggerian affectivity, the second reconstructs the conception of 'originary temporality' at the core of Division II of <i>Being and Time</i>, while the third section undertakes an interpretation of the way Heidegger construes affectivity as various modes of the 'ecstatic temporalizing of Dasein'. The main orientation of the paper is reconstructive. However, some implications for the philosophical study of emotion will be highlighted in the conclusion.</p>
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Affectivity and Temporality in Heidegger

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Jan Slaby

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Heidegger's conception of affectivity, as developed for the most part in *Being and Time*, is reconstructed here with an emphasis on the temporal character of affectivity. While a good number of philosophers of emotion have borrowed from Heidegger's approach, few have so far taken the temporal character of *findingness* [*Befindlichkeit*] into account. This paper has three main parts. The first part revisits the standard reading of Heideggerian affectivity, the second reconstructs the conception of 'originary temporality' at the core of Division II of *Being and Time*, while the third section undertakes an interpretation of the way Heidegger construes affectivity as various modes of the 'ecstatic temporalizing of Dasein'. The main orientation of the paper is reconstructive. However, some implications for the philosophical study of emotion will be highlighted in the conclusion.

*If you're always under the pressure of real identity,
I think that is somewhat of a burden* (Mark Zuckerberg¹).

1 Introduction

16

Why is philosophy concerned with affectivity at all, i.e. with emotions, moods and other phenomena that are commonly considered to be (or involve) 'feelings'? Certainly not because it seeks to understand a class of psychic phenomena among others, which would rather be a task for psychology. As long as one operates with a half-way rigorous, not merely "institutional" conception of philosophy, more must

¹ <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-30/facebook-turns-10-the-mark-zuckerberg-interview> (last accessed on February 4, 2014).

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[AU1]

22 be at stake than illuminating a kind of human-level mental state. At the very least,
23 what it is to be human itself has to figure in what a philosophical inquiry into affectivity
24 is interested in. Roughly then, a specifically philosophical inquiry into affectivity
25 is one that situates its subject matter within the context of a broader endeavor of
26 coming to terms with human existence more generally. What is sought in this kind
27 of inquiry is a structural characterization of affectivity that makes affectivity's role
28 in, contribution to or position vis-à-vis human existence as such explicit. Moreover,
29 and crucially, the guiding idea of 'human existence' itself cannot be simply presupposed
30 but has to figure as an open dimension of the questioning. It cannot be treated as an
31 answer already attained, as would be a psychological or biological 'understanding
32 of man', if taken as firmly established beyond reasonable doubt.

33 This is why Heidegger's understanding of affectivity can be exemplary for a
34 philosophy of emotion deserving its name. In Heidegger's work – notably in the *Being
35 and Time* phase – affectivity figures with a pivotal, albeit highly interconnected role
36 among the constituents of what Heidegger calls *Dasein*. Now, *Dasein* is the peculiar
37 entity whose being is to be questioned and explicated, because this very being is
38 itself ontological – it is a lived *understanding of being*. And being itself, in turn, is
39 ultimately that whose sense is to be explicated by philosophy, according to Heidegger
40 conception of it as 'fundamental ontology'. The being of *Dasein*, obviously, is
41 what Heidegger deems to be the ontological structure that is exclusive to humans.
42 Thus, if our goal is to illuminate affectivity in a truly philosophical manner, we are
43 on a promising track if we follow Heidegger's lead by appreciating the gist of his
44 analysis of *Befindlichkeit*.

45 This is certainly not the only option there is in order to gain a philosophical
46 understanding of human affectivity, but it is a path worth taking. Now, a good
47 number of philosophers working on emotion and affectivity have already traveled
48 some distance on this path, taking up aspects of Heidegger's approach to 'findingness'
49 in their own conceptions.² However, for the most part, they have done so in a manner
50 that fails to appreciate the extent to which everything Heidegger says about
51 *Befindlichkeit* is entangled with the rest of the ontological undertaking of *Being and
52 Time*. As a consequence, what we mostly get is sketchy, partial and thus incomplete,
53 often even somewhat distorted so-called 'Heideggerian' approaches to affectivity.
54 The aim of the present paper is to take some steps toward alleviating this situation.
55 It sets out to draw the contours of a more encompassing treatment of Heideggerian
56 affectivity, and it does so chiefly by focusing on temporality. For indeed, I will
57 endeavor to show that *time* is the horizon against which affectivity takes on its
58 peculiar character as a core enabling structure of human existence.

59 To prepare the territory for the subsequent discussion, I will, in the first section,
60 rehearse the central characteristics of *Befindlichkeit* (findingness), as outlined in sections
61 29, 30 and 40 of *Being and Time*. Taken together with some illuminating remarks
62 on moods in his lecture course on the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*

²Among the authors I have in mind are Ratcliffe 2008 and Helm 2001, although the latter rarely mentions Heidegger explicitly. I also enroll my own former self in the list of half-way appropriations of Heideggerian affectivity (cf. Slaby 2008 and Slaby and Stephan 2008).

(1929/1930), this provides something like a standard reading of Heidegger on affectivity. 63
 In the second section I will discuss, in general terms, the temporal character of the 64
 care-structure – what Heidegger elaborates in most of division II of *Being and Time*, 65
 and most notably in §§ 65–69. Only here, in what might be seen as the central – but 66
 also the most difficult – sections of the book, the full sense of findingness is brought 67
 out and placed within its proper context of intelligibility: the finite, ecstatic and 68
 dynamic unfolding of ‘originary temporality’, which is radically different from and 69
 more basic than what is commonly assumed as ‘objective time’. Close to the center 70
 of the explication of originary temporality is Heidegger’s reconception of death as 71
 that which enables human existence as finite being-possible. Against the back- 72
 ground of this understanding of existential temporality as grounded in death, I will 73
 in the third section revisit the reconstruction of findingness in order to explicate its 74
 temporal character, namely as a fundamental way in which the past (‘*beenness*’) is 75
 weighing on – as both enabling and diffusely imposing limits upon – the forward- 76
 pressing compartments (‘*coming-toward*’) that make up the moment-to-moment 77
 unfolding of human existence. 78

2 Befindlichkeit: The Standard Conception 79

Along with understanding [*Verstehen*] and discourse [*Rede*], findingness 80
 [*Befindlichkeit*] is one of three equiprimordial constituents of Dasein’s *disclosed-* 81
ness [*Erschlossenheit*]. Disclosedness, in turn, is the fundamental character of the 82
 being of Dasein, which is also characterized as *care* (roughly, Dasein’s mode of 83
 being is care while its fundamental character – *enabled by and lived as care* – is 84
 disclosedness). Heidegger introduces the term ‘disclosedness’ as an explication of 85
 what is meant by ‘Da’ in ‘Dasein’. ‘Da’ is usually translated into English as ‘there’, 86
 however the German term carries connotations of ‘here’ and ‘present’ as well (and 87
 conveys a striking sense of immediacy probably absent from the way ‘there’ is 88
 employed in English; cf. SZ, 132). Thus, Dasein is the being that *is its Da* (SZ, 132), 89
 i.e. it is a being whose very being is characterized by a kind of openness – what 90
 Heidegger characterizes as *not-being-locked-up* [*Unverschlossenheit*]. Care is the 91
 mode of being through which this very being and its world are simultaneously man- 92
 ifest – revealed-to-itself, illuminated. Heidegger explicates it thus: 93

When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the *lumen naturale* in man, we have in mind 94
 nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it *is* in such a way as 95
 to be its “there”. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ [“*erleuchtet*”] means that *as Being-in-the-world* 96
 it is cleared [*gelichtet*] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself 97
 the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is 98
 present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, 99
 Dasein brings its “there” along with it. If it lacks its “there”, it is not factually the entity which 100
 is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein is its disclosedness.* (SZ, 133)³ 101

³All direct quotations from SZ are taken from the Macquarrie and Robinson translation (1962); I will modify some of the translations and indicate it accordingly. Page numbers refer to the original German version as these are also provided in the text of M&Q’s translation.

102 Care and the disclosedness it enables and enacts might be seen roughly as
 103 successor notions to what is thematized, in the phenomenological tradition and
 104 elsewhere, under the rubric of 'intentionality'. But the mentalistic context in which
 105 'intentionality' figures gets replaced by a broader ontological context: care – as the
 106 fundamental way of 'being one's Da' – is not the directedness of a mind to a world,
 107 but a fundamental mode of Dasein's *being-in-the-world*, which is a *dwelling in*
 108 *meaningful surroundings*. Accordingly, to treat findingness as one of three fundamen-
 109 tal constituents of Dasein's disclosedness, as Heidegger does, amounts to assigning
 110 to affectivity an utmost importance in enabling and performing Dasein's simultaneous
 111 openness to itself and its world (and more than that, as we will see below).

112 A terminological note is in order before the reconstruction begins. The terms
 113 Heidegger employs in the original German text for dealing with affectivity are
 114 *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*. While the latter can easily be translated as 'mood'
 115 (although the case can be made for 'attunement' as a more literal rendition),
 116 *Befindlichkeit* is a translator's nightmare. This is not the place for an in-depth discus-
 117 sion of this matter, so I simply opt to follow John Haugeland in attempting a half-way
 118 literal translation by employing a term of art: 'findingness' (see Haugeland 2013,
 119 e.g. 196).⁴ Findingness captures the sense of the German *'sich finden' / 'sich befinden'* –
 120 the way or ways of finding oneself in one's surroundings. This is a lot better than
 121 "state of mind",⁵ a good deal better than "disposedness" (Blattner 2006; although this
 122 captures some of the important connotations), and also better than "attunement",⁶
 123 which nicely captures the etymological sense of 'Stimmung' but threatens to narrow
 124 the meaning of *Befindlichkeit* to just one of its central dimensions. I will for the most
 125 part use 'findingness', but will also occasionally speak of 'attunement' in contexts
 126 where its connotations seem to have been intended by Heidegger.

127 The importance of findingness is duly reflected in its central characteristics
 128 [*'Wesensbestimmungen'*], as detailed in SZ, § 29. Even before Heidegger outlines
 129 three such core characteristics, he stresses the ubiquity of moods in the being of
 130 Dasein. Moods, in brief, are the ontical concretions of the ontological structure
 131 'findingness'. Thus, that Dasein is 'finding' (ontologically) means that it is constantly
 132 attuned to its surroundings; what happens in this dimension of its being is always
 133 only a change of one mode of findingness to another, never a change from a state
 134 that is without mood to one that is with mood (cf. SZ, 134). In a similarly emphatic
 135 way, Heidegger proclaims the ubiquity and depth of moods when discussing the
 136 nature of a 'fundamental mood' [*Grundstimmung*] of Dasein, in his lecture course
 137 *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (cf. 1929/1930, § 17).⁷

⁴Haugeland's earlier suggestion was even more forced: *sofindingness* (2000, 52) – I consent to Haugeland's later admission that this would overdo it: findingness works well enough.

⁵"State-of-mind" is the term Maquarrie and Robinson chose for translating *Befindlichkeit* in their 1962 translation of *Being and Time*.

⁶"Attunement" is the term Joan Stambaugh employs to translate *Befindlichkeit* in her 1996 translation of *Being and Time*.

⁷"Attunements are *not side-effects*, but are something which in advance determine our being with one another. It seems as though an attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an

2.1 Findingness Discloses Facticity

138

Against the background of Dasein's constantly being-attuned, three closely related core characteristics of findingness come into view. First, and most importantly from an ontological perspective, findingness discloses Dasein's facticity or 'thrownness' – the inevitability of its factual being, the brute 'that it is and has to be' (cf. SZ, 134). Most conspicuously in 'negative' moods, findingness is the becoming-manifest of the burdensome facticity of one's own being, i.e. that one has no choice but to *be* here and now as this particular being (with these and that characteristics etc.) in this particular (i.e. specifically constrained and limited) space of possibilities. 'Thrownness' stands for both, Dasein's particular situatedness insofar as it is tied up with and determines its 'having to be'.⁸ This is why 'findingness' is the appropriate ontological notion for the existential dimension of mood and emotion: moods indeed pertain to the various ways in which Dasein *finds* itself – i.e. 'comes to itself' as situated amidst, and itself part of, factual circumstances with which it has to put up in one way or another.

Importantly, the way in which findingness discloses facticity is not explicit awareness, but rather – at least for the most part – a peculiar 'turning-away' [*Abkehr*]. Burdened by a gloomy mood, a dash of sadness for example, Dasein will not simply acknowledge its brute and enigmatic facticity (*the naked 'there'*), but instead for the most part evade this potential existential insight by laboriously turning away from it and onto some entity or other in the world. There are at least two noteworthy examples in Heidegger's oeuvre for how this pervasive 'turning-away' unfolds, and they both point directly toward the fundamental role of findingness for the being of Dasein, i.e. they are used by Heidegger as illustrations of how ontic moods reflect ontological findingness and thus reveal the outline of the fundamental mode of being of Dasein. The first is the seminal exposition of anxiety in *Being and Time* (§ 40); the second is the in-depth phenomenology of boredom in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/1930).

To anxiety Heidegger grants a crucial methodological role in the analytic of Dasein. Anxiety is a mode of attunement in which the ontological structure of existence (care) is brought out in a clear and simplified manner. However, and crucially, in everyday living anxiety unfolds such that its very structure is for the most part evaded. It is part of anxiety's everyday guise that Dasein constantly 'flees' from it so that the insight into Dasein's predicament that is offered by anxiety is not confronted head-on.⁹ The same goes for boredom. Although ultimately disclosing

atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through. It does not merely seem so, it is so; and, faced with this fact, we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experiences and consciousness. It is a matter of *seeing* and *saying* what is happening here." (1929/1930, 100; Engl. tr. 67).

[AU2] ⁸For an insightful elaboration of the complex meaning of thrownness in Heidegger, see Withy 2011.

⁹To be more precise, this 'everyday mode' of anxiety is not strictly anxiety but rather *fear* as the inauthentic, 'fallen' form of anxiety; see SZ, 189: "And only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such Being-in-the-world, which is concerned-finding being alongside the

173 the meaninglessness and ungroundedness of (either a certain span or even all of)
 174 one's momentary existence, boredom does not bring this to our explicit recognition –
 175 far from it. Instead, nascent boredom, in a way roughly similar to anxiety, will bring
 176 us to laboriously struggle to distract ourselves, busy ourselves somehow so as to not
 177 face up to the existential insight original to this mood (cf. Slaby 2010). To be sure,
 178 when bored, Dasein *is* confronted, deep down, with what is going on, but it won't
 179 let itself be brought to acknowledge this affective "message" in a direct manner.

180 This is what Heidegger means when he says moods disclose, for the most part,
 181 in the mode of evasion or "turning away" [*Abkehr*]. This makes it clear that the way
 182 findingness discloses facticity is a form of "having manifest" or "being aware" (if
 183 one may still speak this way) that is radically different from – and deeper than – any
 184 kind of reflective self-awareness. The brute facticity of Dasein's existential predicament
 185 is somehow 'there' in mood, but not as a cognitive or perceptual presence but
 186 as the enigma of 'naked being' lurking underneath all superficial distractions.¹⁰ Like
 187 a silent scream of horror in the depths of our being, the awareness of facticity is
 188 what we usually not make clear to us – but it is still 'there' at all times, just usually
 189 drowned out by a layer of laboriousness, talkativeness or distracting mental activity.
 190 Still, it is ready to burst forth at any given moment, however fleeting and distorted.
 191 Only in few and outstanding instances of our affective lives – authentic anxiety and
 192 profound boredom among them – the enigma of our being is for a moment lit up
 193 lucidly as what it is. Only then will Dasein come face-to-face with the 'naked there'
 194 of its facticity. Its mode of being may then change from inauthentic everydayness
 195 into authentic existence.

196 2.2 *Findingness Discloses Being-in-the-World as a Whole*

197 The second fundamental characteristic of findingness is that it has always already
 198 disclosed Dasein's being-in-the-world as a whole and that only on the basis of
 199 this initial disclosure is a directedness toward something specific at all possible. In
 200 virtue of this holistic character of its way of disclosure, findingness forms a
 201 backdrop to all specific modes of directedness, in the manner of a simultaneous
 202 disclosure of world, one's own being and one's being-with others (cf. SZ, 137). A
 203 key emphasis here is on '*as a whole*' – i.e., not this or that entity or aspect of the
 204 world is revealed as being such and such in findingness, but the world and Dasein's
 205 being-in it as a whole is specifically disclosed in a certain manner (compare

"world", be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the 'world', inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself." (translation modified)

¹⁰"Even if Dasein is 'assured' in its belief about its 'whither', or if, in a spirit of rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about its "whence", all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal fact of the case: for the mood brings Dasein before the "that-it-is" of its "there", which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma." (SZ, 136 – translation slightly modified)

Wittgenstein's remark: 'The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man'¹¹). One can see here that this second point is basically already implied in the first characteristic, i.e. that findingness discloses Dasein's facticity. Think of anxiety again: how else can the facticity of *our being* be disclosed than by lighting up the entire structure of our current dwelling in the world? What should also be noted here is the way that self-disclosure and world-disclosure are inextricable in findingness: self and world are 'there' only in constitutive mutuality. Outside of artificial and belated cognitive maneuvers, there is no self-disclosure without world-disclosure and no world-disclosure that is not equally self-disclosure (self-disclosure is here meant in the non-cognitive way just hinted at). Crucially, the peculiar way that the 'self' figures in disclosure is provided-for by affectivity – roughly, *being affected* amounts to this: a non-reflective mode of self-involvement, a *being-brought-back* to oneself, as Heidegger will later call it (in SZ, § 68). In this more precise, holistic sense, affectivity is pervasive in Dasein's disclosedness. We will return to this in more detail in the third section when discussing Heidegger's temporal interpretation of findingness.

2.3 Findingness Constitutes Dasein's Openness to the World

The third fundamental characteristic of Heideggerian affectivity is more or less a continuation, or rather: an application of the second one. The way the world is encountered in our everyday practical dealings [*Besorgen*] is crucially determined by findingness.¹² The encountering entities amidst one's projects and dealings unfolds in the form of 'being affected by...', i.e. being bothered by the unhandy, being stricken with fear by the dangerous, being angered by the offensive, elated by the good, or contented by what works seamlessly etc. These various modes of being-affected by aspects of the current situation are enabled by a broad range of prior attunements or 'affectabilities' [*Angänglichkeit*], such as fearfulness, irritability, shamefulness and so on. Thus, Heidegger construes affectivity broadly as an interplay of general background attunements (i.e., ground-level modes of world-disclosure) with more focused, situational foreground affects (roughly, specifically directed intentional affective comportments). A basic enabling structure consisting of various modes of affectability on the basis of which concrete affects – specific ways of being-affected-by... – take shape in line with situational circumstance. Accordingly, Heidegger holds that findingness constitutes Dasein's fundamental 'openness' to the world, as it is articulated in a range of distinct dimensions of affectability in terms of which entities are encountered in everyday life. This marks the way in which the

¹¹ Cf. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.43.

¹² "Existentially, attunement implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we encounter something that matters to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'." (SZ, 137/8 – translation slightly modified)

241 world is always already disclosed in general ways – namely, in terms of dimensions
 242 of *possibility*: as that which *has the potential* to scare, to please, to anger, to elate, to
 243 bore, or embarrass us. On the flip side, findingness equals the respective ‘how’ of
 244 Dasein’s current dwelling in the world, in the sense of the multiplicity of ways in
 245 which its own being is an issue for it – how it lets the world specifically matter to it.

246 Now, all of this will have to be made much more precise by way of an explication
 247 of the temporal character of the care-structure. Right before he embarks upon the
 248 quest of a temporal re-interpretation of findingness, Heidegger presents the upshot
 249 of his initial characterization of *Befindlichkeit* by way of a succinct summary to
 250 start § 68b; we can use it to sum up the key points discussed in the present section:

251 The “there” gets equiprimordially disclosed by one’s mood in every case – or gets closed
 252 off by it. Having a mood brings Dasein *face to face* with its thrownness in such a manner
 253 that its thrownness is not known as such but disclosed far more primordially in ‘how one is’.
 254 Existentially, “*being-thrown*” means finding oneself in some attunement or other. One’s
 255 attunement is therefore based upon thrownness. My mood represents the specific way in
 256 which I am primarily that thrown entity. (SZ, 339/40 – translation modified)¹³

257 The crucial aspects are all in there: Mood discloses the facticity of Dasein’s
 258 thrownness not in the manner of cognition but in a more primordial way, i.e. through
 259 ‘how it is for one’ – which might as well – and usually does – amount to a kind of
 260 closing-off of the *Da*. The precise meaning of the word *Befindlichkeit* is made clear:
 261 *to find oneself in this way or that*, so that one can say that mood is the specific way
 262 in which I am the thrown entity that I am. Quite fundamentally, then, moods are
 263 ways of being. This resonates well with a gripping passage in the *Fundamental*
 264 *Concepts of Metaphysics*, where Heidegger explicitly discusses the term ‘*Weise*’ as
 265 in ‘way of being’, stating that *Weise* is meant in the sense of “a melody” that quite
 266 literally sets the tone for our being (cf. GA 29/30, 101).¹⁴

267 3 Temporality as the Sense of Care

268 The analysis of findingness is placed on a more thorough plane by Heidegger in
 269 Division II of *Being and Time*, where the existential analytic of Dasein is partly
 270 repeated as an analysis of Dasein’s temporal constitution, which is anchored in an

¹³In the German original, this passage reads thus: „Das Da wird je gleichursprünglich durch Stimmung erschlossen, bzw. verschlossen. Die Gestimmtheit bringt das Dasein vor seine Geworfenheit, so zwar, daß diese gerade nicht als solche erkannt, sondern in dem, »wie einem ist«, weit ursprünglicher erschlossen ist. Das Geworfensein besagt existenzial: sich so oder so befinden. Die Befindlichkeit gründet daher in der Geworfenheit. Stimmung repräsentiert die Weise, in der ich je das geworfene Seiende primär bin.“ (SZ, 339/40)

¹⁴This is the passage in full: “It is clear that attunements are not merely something at hand. They themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and fundamental way of being, indeed of being-there [*Da-sein*], and this always directly includes being with one another. Attunements are ways of the being-there of *Da-sein*, and thus ways of being-away. An attunement is a way, not merely a form or mode, but a way [*Weise*] – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way [*Art und Weise*] of his being.“ (GA 29/30, 101, Engl. 67)

account of death as that which enables the disclosure of Dasein *as a whole*. Death, 271
 as the existence-enabling “possibility of the impossibility of Dasein” (SZ, 250), 272
 establishes the finite futurity that is the pinnacle of existential temporality. Before 273
 reconstructing the temporal character of findingness and drawing conclusions from 274
 it for the philosophical study of emotion, we will, in this section, turn to the difficult- 275
 to-grasp general understanding of ‘originary temporality’ as the sense of authentic 276
 care. This requires a detailed engagement with some of the most difficult parts of 277
Being and Time. 278

The sections on temporality, most notably § 65, but also the subsequent section 279
 in chapters 4 and 5, play a pivotal role in the architecture of *Being and Time*. Here 280
 Heidegger begins to show that the care structure – and thus the being of Dasein 281
 itself – is to be understood as enabled and constituted by time, or more precisely: by 282
 the ‘originary temporality’ [*ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit*] of Dasein. “*The primordial* 283
unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (SZ, 327). This basically amounts 284
 to the *central point* of the whole book: Where the modern philosophical tradition 285
 had put a constitutive subject in place, understood in some substantive way as an 286
 object or process with certain (mental, rational etc.) properties, Heidegger substitutes 287
time as the ultimate enabling dimension of any understanding of being. Time, as 288
 originary temporality, is the horizon of any encountering of entities *as entities*, it is what 289
 makes transcendence possible. Only at this fundamental level of analysis can the 290
 being of Dasein – as the being that *is* as an ‘understanding of being’ – be understood 291
 at long last without illegitimate objectification, or so Heidegger thinks.¹⁵ 292

Not entirely surprisingly, then, originary temporality, as Dasein’s temporal 293
 constitution, is presented as fundamentally distinct from – and more basic than – 294
 ‘ordinary’ time (i.e. time as pre-theoretically understood). In fact, it is hard to 295
 overestimate the differences between what we have come to intuitively take time to 296
 be and what Heidegger explicates as originary temporality. As he undertakes to show, 297
 the ‘vulgar’ understanding of time that construes time as an infinite succession of 298
 self-same moments or ‘nows’ [*Jetztpunkte*] and moreover as a dimension that is in 299
 the last instance independent from the being of Dasein (i.e., allegedly ‘objective’ – as 300
 physical or cosmic time is supposed to be), is, though derivative from it, radically 301
 distinct from the primordial ‘timeishness’ of Dasein. Concretely, three characteristics 302
 mark the difference between originary temporality and the everyday conception of 303
 time. In contrast to time as ordinarily understood, originary time “is” only as the 304
temporalizing of Dasein; originary time is *finite*; and originary time is *ecstatic*. Each 305
 of these three aspects of originary temporality gives us quite a mouthful to clarify.¹⁶ 306

¹⁵This is a project that is also thoroughly reflected in Heidegger’s tantalizing interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, where he undertakes to reconceive Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception in terms of original temporality, paralleling the threefold synthesis outlined in the A deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason* – the respective syntheses of apprehension, of reproduction and of recognition – with the explication of the three dimension’s or ecstases of temporality (*coming-toward*, *having-been*, and *enpresenting*); see Käufer 2013 for a helpful discussion.

¹⁶I follow Heidegger in speaking interchangeably of ‘originary temporality’ and ‘originary time’. To see why this is warranted, see SZ, 329, see Blattner 2005, 316–321. for an in-depth explication and also Hoffman 2005, 331.

307 **3.1 The Temporalizing of Dasein**

308 To begin with, Heidegger holds that Dasein is not ‘in time’, but unfolds *as* time.
 309 What must time be in order for this claim to make any sense? First and foremost,
 310 it cannot be something like a container into which Dasein is somehow placed
 311 (as invited by spatialized metaphors of time, such as in the image of a ‘timeline’).
 312 This is why Heidegger notes that time is not some entity, but that it is only in its
 313 unfolding, so to speak – time *is* only as *temporalizing*: “Temporality “is” not an
 314 *entity* at all. It is not, but it *temporalizes*. [...] Temporality temporalizes, namely
 315 possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of
 316 being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.”
 317 (SZ, 328 – translation modified). These modes of temporalizing, as we will see, are
 318 the existential versions of what we pre-theoretically know as future, past and present –
 319 corresponding to the dimensions of the care structure: projection (*being-ahead-...*),
 320 thrownness (*already-in-a-world*) and falling (*being-amidst-entities*).¹⁷ In the tempo-
 321 ralizing of Dasein, these dimensions dynamically interlock so that each contains the
 322 entirety of the care-structure: existential future (Dasein’s ‘coming-toward-itself’)
 323 comes with a specific modification of past and present, existential past (‘beenness’)
 324 modifies present and future, while the present (‘enpresenting’) entails a modification
 325 of past and future. These interfolded modes of originary temporality are thus not
 326 external, ‘cosmic’ dimensions in which we find ourselves situated, but intrinsic
 327 modes of the unfolding of our being as Dasein. In fact, as we will see presently, it
 328 can be quite misleading to even use the worn-out temporal expressions ‘present’,
 329 ‘past’ and ‘future’ at the beginning of the exposition. It is these dimensions whose
 330 understanding is thoroughly revised on Heidegger’s account.

331 **3.2 Originary Temporality as Finite**

332 In contrast to the alleged *infinite* time of everyday understanding, original temporality
 333 is *finite*. With this, we reach the most fundamental dimension of the existential
 334 analytic. On the face of it, the situation is plain enough: Given the concrete aim –
 335 namely, to make plausible that the being of Dasein itself *is* time – it is clear that
 336 original temporality must be shown to share Dasein’s essential finitude. But how to
 337 explicate that? To begin with, Dasein’s finitude cannot be thought of as the finitude
 338 of *a process* that will eventually come to an end – as that would have us fall back to
 339 an objectified understanding of something present-at-hand, at odds with the concep-
 340 tion of the being of Dasein as existence. Instead, Dasein *exists finitely* (SZ, 329).
 341 Dasein’s finitude is a character of existence, but not just one existentially among
 342 others, but the fundamental enabling condition of existence itself. With this, we are

¹⁷I leave out the somewhat complicated role of ‘discourse’ [*Rede*] here.

led straight to the difficult theme of *death* as it figures in the initial chapters of Division II.¹⁸ Heidegger puts the upshot of the existential interpretation of death as follows:

Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost [*eigenste*], which is non-relational [*unbezüglich*], and which is not to be outstripped [*unüberholbare*]. As such, death is something *distinctively* impending [*ausgezeichneter* *Bevorstand*]. (SZ, 250/1)

What is central here is the character of death as an ever-impending possibility – after all, Dasein *will* die eventually while it *can* die at any moment –, a possibility which at the same time is, from an existential vantage point, strictly *impossible*. This is because once the possibility of death is finally ‘actualized’, existence itself is no longer (what Heidegger means by saying that death cannot be outstripped). One might thus say that death is an *impossible possibility* of Dasein (Mulhall 2005b, 304). Death, existentially conceived, is only as possibility but thereby, crucially, makes existence itself possible as the inevitable *being-ahead* of itself (trivially: at every moment in life, something still ‘stands before us’ – and as soon as nothing stands before us anymore, our life is already over). This is the basic point of the care-structure: a constant thrusting forward that can never find completion within existence itself; Dasein is in this sense never ‘finished’, never ‘attained’. Again in the words of Mulhall: “Hence, death – unlike any other possibility of Dasein’s Being – is always and only a possibility; our fatedness to this purely impending threat makes concrete the articulated unity of our existence as thrown projection, our being always already delivered over to being ahead of ourselves” (Mulhall 2005a, b, 126). Thus we see that existential death – not the event of a life’s ‘ending’

[AU3]

¹⁸Heidegger is at pains to distinguish ‘death’ [*Tod*] as an existiale from ‘demise’ [*Ableben*] and ‘perishing’ [*Verenden*]. Death understood existentially is not the biological event of perishing (an animal’s ‘end of life’) and neither the human (chiefly institutional) event of demise. From this, some authors have concluded that it is conceivable that an instance of Dasein might ‘survive’ its existential death (see SZ, §§ 50–53, and Haugeland 2013 for clarification; see also Blattner 2007, 315). A remarkable (if contestable) discussion of a possible instance of existential death that does not coincide with demise is Jonathan Lear’s narrating the life of Plenty Coups, the last chief of the Crow tribe who physically and ‘spiritually’ survived the total collapse of a cultural framework of intelligibility, i.e. any possible way to be as a Crow (see Lear 2006, and the illuminating discussion in Ratcliffe 2013b). Mulhall 2007 offers a different take on the difficulties inherent in Heidegger’s distinction between death, perishing and demise; and as I understand Mulhall’s overall position on death he would deny the possibility of a human’s ‘life going on’ after existential death. I cannot discuss this here, as this debate is shockingly intricate. I tentatively side with Mulhall, however admitting that I haven’t fully made up my mind about the matter; Carel 2007 also comes down on my side of the divide. Iain Thompson’s 2013 recent encompassing and complexifying interpretation sides roughly with Blattner and Haugeland but tries to bring death and demise closer to one another. His reading, however, is hampered by a shocking misconstrual of ‘*Ableben*’ (demise) as ‘life’s ending that is consciously experienced’ (see 2013, 265). I think it is obvious from the (German) text in § 49 that the chief contrast between perishing and demise has not the least to do with conscious experience – rather, it seems to reflect the for Heidegger fundamental (i.e., unbridgeable) gulf between Dasein and what ‘merely lives’ (i.e. animals). Confusion is also caused by not paying enough attention to the trivial-seeming fact that Heidegger holds *death* [*Tod*] and *dying* [*sterben*] terminologically separate (e.g. SZ, 247).

367 but the ever-impending *possibility* of no-longer being-possible – *enables* existence
 368 by delineating a finite but open dimension of being-possible.¹⁹ To bring this point
 369 home, however, we have to fully grasp what it means that death is an *impossible*
 370 possibility. Mulhall tackles the gist of the matter when he explains how this *impos-*
 371 *sibility* of death within existence accounts for the way death is factually disclosed.
 372 Since death is essentially ungraspable as something manifest (i.e. impossible *within*
 373 existence), it can only be disclosed through what *is* graspable in existence, and these
 374 are the ‘regular’ (i.e. non-absolute) existentiell possibilities that make up Dasein’s
 375 factual existence. With this we come right back to what we earlier called the “silent
 376 scream of horror in the depth of our being” (section I above), as it now becomes
 377 clear that death is what is implicated, as constant possibility, in all and every of our
 378 compartments:

379 Precisely because death can be characterized as Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational and not-
 380 to-be outstripped possibility, and hence as an omnipresent, ineluctable, but non-actualizable
 381 possibility of its being, which means that it is an ungraspable but undeniable aspect of every
 382 moment of its existence, it follows that Dasein can only relate to it in and through our
 383 relation to what *is* graspable in our existence – namely the authentic existentiell possibilities
 384 that constitute it from moment to moment. Death [...] is shown to be graspable essentially
 385 indirectly, as an omnipresent condition of every moment of Dasein’s directly graspable
 386 existence. It is not a specific feature of the existential terrain, but rather a light or shadow
 387 emanating evenly and implacably from every such feature; it is the ground against which
 388 those features configure themselves. (Mulhall 2007, 305)²⁰

389 Now, switching to the register of temporality, we see that death is the never-to-be-
 390 outstripped *futurity* of existence, manifest in authentic *forerunning toward death*.
 391 Not because it is what stands ‘at the end’ of Dasein’s existence but by being the
 392 steady possibility of being no longer. Originary future is thus not some ‘later’ time
 393 span that is ‘not yet’ real, but the constant – in each moment – *coming toward itself*
 394 of Dasein, i.e. its unrelenting pressing-ahead into possibilities-to-be. From this
 395 stems the specific sense of a *finite* futurity: while not escaping its inevitable ‘no
 396 more’, as long as it is, there is always something that *comes up*, that *is imminent*,
 397 that Dasein *will have to face up to*. This also clarifies why Heidegger accords a
 398 priority to the future over the other dimensions of originary temporality, *having-been*
 399 (past) and *enpresenting* (present). The constant forward-pressing openness of

¹⁹This also importantly shows that the ‘Da’ as which Dasein exists (cf. SZ, 132) is in the first instance a temporal dimension, while space, though seemingly on the same constitutional plane as time, is explicable in terms of the temporal activity of ‘taking space’, i.e. acts of orienting-toward that can be shown to be specific concretizations of the interplay of the three temporal dimensions: “*Only on the basis of its ecstatic-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space.*” (SZ, 369).

²⁰That what is referred to here is indeed that “silent scream of horror at the depth of our being” that I spoke about earlier is evidenced in by the fact that Heidegger comes explicitly back to the theme of anxiety in the course of his explication of authentic being toward death [*Vorlaufen*] in SZ, § 53: “*That attunement which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized being, is anxiety.* In this attunement, Dasein finds itself *face to face* with the “nothing” of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious *about* the potentiality-for-being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. [...] Being-toward-death is essentially anxiety.” (SZ, 265–66 – translation modified)

being-toward-death – with death as the always looming but never-to-be-attained 400
 ‘no-more’ – is what provides the fundamental movement-tendency inherent in care. 401
 Death ‘drags’ Dasein forward, as it were – as a being-possible that is definitive but 402
 indeterminate, individualizing and not to be outstripped by any other possibility. 403
 As death is *definitely coming*, as long as Dasein is, existence itself has this very 404
 character: *coming-toward itself* (Heidegger here alludes to the German literal sense 405
 of *Zu-kunft* as (*auf sich*) *zukommen*). 406

With this we can finally also appreciate the ontological grounds of the ontic 407
 sense of a ‘time span’ allotted to each case of Dasein. This is already implicit in the 408
 term *Vorlaufen* (fore-running), as this is reminiscent of ‘vorläufig’, which could be 409
 translated as temporary/preliminary, while it has the literal sense of *fore* and 410
running(ly). What existential death opens up is Dasein’s ‘temporality’ – its character 411
 of drifting toward its inevitable but indeterminate end (more precisely: toward its 412
being-over).²¹ As Heidegger at one point grimly puts it, as soon as Dasein comes 413
 into existence, “its days are already counted” (SZ, 413)²² – though indeterminate as 414
 to the concrete *when* of its inevitable ‘no more’, a finite lifetime is granted to each 415
 case of Dasein. This is essentially *my* time, *your* time – *Jeweiligkeit* being a fitting 416
 denomination, as it captures the precise temporal sense of what in Division I of 417
Being and Time is introduced as *Jemeiningkeit* (cf. Hoffman 2007).²³ What is meant 418
 is our in each case specific ‘lifetime’ that I can either spend inauthentically by just 419
 letting it run its course, or that I can appropriate authentically in forerunning toward 420
 death, i.e. by existing *in the face* of death, embracing the essential finitude of existence, 421
 by taking responsibility for *my life* as that which cannot be delegated to any- 422
 one else and which cannot receive its purpose from anywhere but from within itself. 423

3.3 Originary Temporality as Ecstatic 424

How about temporality’s ‘ecstatic’ character? In the account given so far, this third 425
 characteristic of originary temporality did already lurk in the margins. The sweeping 426
 and radical claim that Dasein *is* its temporality can make sense only when it becomes 427

²¹ That Dasein’s “end” – another word for existential death – is meant in the precise temporal sense of Dasein’s *being over* is clear from the term Heidegger employed for it in his 1924 manuscript „Der Begriff der Zeit”: *Vorbei* – as in the following: „Was ist dieses: *je den eigenen Tod haben? Es ist ein Vorlaufen des Daseins zu seinem Vorbei als einer in Gewißheit und völliger Unbestimmtheit bevorstehenden äußersten Möglichkeit seiner selbst.*” (GA 64, 116)

²² Which is obviously the ontic rendering of the ontological fact that “[f]actically, Dasein is dying as long as it exists” (SZ 251), which means that while death is not attainable as an *actualized* possibility (i.e. not realizable *within* existence), it is all the more manifest as *possibility* (either inauthentically in fearful evasion or authentically in anxious forerunning toward death).

²³ Piotr Hoffman 2007, drawing on Heidegger’s 1924 manuscript „Der Begriff der Zeit” (GA 64), interestingly describes how Heidegger first used ‚*Jeweiligkeit*’ but then apparently dropped the notion which is for the most part absent from *Being and Time* (save several employments of the adjective ‚*jeweilig*’, which, however, seem mostly non-terminological).

428 clear how temporality relates to Dasein's transcendence – i.e., for the essential
 429 *orientation-toward...* which is characteristic of care (the feature formerly known as
 430 'intentionality').²⁴ Now, on the face of it, the ecstatic character announces itself in
 431 the fact that originary temporality is not a homogeneous succession, but a discon-
 432 tinuous dynamic. Part of the discontinuity lies in a dynamic tendency in temporal-
 433 izing that lets one temporal dimension assume dominance over the others, modifying
 434 them accordingly.²⁵ What Heidegger intends to capture by employing the term
 435 'ecstatic' is this tendency of '*moving out toward ...*', unfolding in the interplay of
 436 its three dimensions – coming-toward-itself (future), having-been (past) and enpre-
 437 senting (present). "*Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself.*"
 438 (SZ, 329).

439 The use of term 'ecstatic', taken from the Greek '*ekstasis*' (best translated as
 440 'rapture'), might be understood by noting that Dasein's temporalizing unfolds as
 441 several distinct modes of *engagement-with-....* Thus, Dasein's temporalizing is not
 442 a dealing with 'time' as such, but time 'happens' – *temporalizes* – in Dasein's con-
 443 crete dealings with entities in the world. This might initially be illustrated by some
 444 routine everyday comportment. Take any given instance of dealing-with-something,
 445 such as a shoemaker's fixing a broken shoe. Oriented ahead toward the goal-state of
 446 the fixed, wearable shoe, i.e. the shoe ready-to-walk-with (future – the *to-be-*
 447 *realized*), the broken shoe is presently taken up, worked on, concretely dealt with
 448 (present – the *entity presently encountered*) against an enabling and constraining
 449 background of possibilities and abilities, concretely embodied in the shoemaker's
 450 tools, routines and skills (past – the *established background of readily usable*
 451 *resources, materials, skills etc.*). Quite obviously, these three dimensions not only
 452 hang together but form an articulated dynamic – neither can be what it is without the
 453 others' playing their roles. But each dimension can 'take the lead' in a given
 454 sequence of their interplay, so that we have three distinguishable modes of '*moving*
 455 *out toward...*'.

456 With this, we see quite clearly that the past is not something that forever lies
 457 behind us as an expired span of time, but that it is a live dimension of our being –
 458 steadily manifest as the concrete 'from whence' our existence factually unfolds:
 459 equipment, materials, skills, abilities, in short: the world – long established and
 460 factually 'given' – usually taken for granted but crucially 'brought to live' in our
 461 taking it up specifically in the context of a present endeavor.²⁶ When the past

²⁴For a neat exegetical clarification of what Heidegger means by 'transcendence', see Käufer 2005.

²⁵Heidegger at one point even quips that everyday lived time "has holes": "When Dasein is 'living along' in an everyday concerned manner, it just never understands itself as running along in a continuously enduring sequence of pure 'nows'. By reason of this covering up, the time which Dasein allows itself has gaps in it, as it were. Often we do not bring a 'day' together again when we come back to the time which we have 'used'." (SZ, 409) This passage is from Div. II, ch. 6 in which the degeneration of originary temporality into the ordinary (or 'vulgar') understanding of time is made plausible. However, roughly one might say that this peculiar discontinuity of time is carried over from originary temporality to time as ordinarily understood.

²⁶Cf. the following passage Heidegger penned in 1924: „Das gewärtigende Besorgen *lebt* als von der Ausgelegtheit geführtes *seine* Vergangenheit. Das Dasein ist so gerade im nächsten Miteinanderbesorgen sein Gewesensein." (GA 64, 89).

assumes dominance in the ecstatic unfolding of the dimensions, Dasein is brought back upon its *beenness*, and this entails that *enpresenting* and *coming toward* are specifically modified, for example when a traditional procedure or tool disproportionately sets the stage for ongoing practice, determining the aim accordingly (a certain product style, certain limits or characteristics imposed upon the result etc.). Likewise, the future is not a distant, not-yet-realized 'later', but the dimension of *coming-toward* in current existence: the concrete coming-into-being of what we are in the business of realizing, thereby 'summoning up' the other dimensions, imposing a concrete direction upon them – as when an innovative idea leads to adjustments in one's established procedures, reconfiguring ongoing practice and aligning it with available resources in a new way. Thus, Dasein is perpetually running-ahead-of-itself in specific ways (coming toward), while it is bound and enabled by what is already there (having been), so that it can encounter – deal with, work on, engage – entities here and now (enpresenting). Each of these constitutive dimensions can ecstatically 'overreach', so to speak, and lead to concrete adjustments in the other dimensions.

We have seen that two aspects are crucial for coming to grips with the ecstatic character of originary temporality. First, originary temporalizing never unfolds explicitly *as time* (e.g., as a measurably 'span' or some such), but rather in concrete engagement- or dealings-with-entities (i.e., as this or that mode of being of Dasein). Second, within each such dynamic sequence of engagement, the three dimensions of temporalizing are folded into each other, so that each is respectively modified under the concrete lead of one of the other ecstases. In fact, I think one would not be too far off the mark with the claim that the originary temporalizing of Dasein is nothing other than *concrete human action*. Each instance of action is the engaging of something at hand (present) out of a background of already-established and thus ready-to-draw-on resources and capabilities (past) in order to bring something about or into being (future). It is Heidegger's contention that in the material dynamic of situated agency, time is literally 'made', it springs up, originates.

The shoemaker's example is obviously drawn from the realm of everyday routine coping, it will thus likely be lived in the inauthentic mode. What would be an authentic instance of ecstatic temporalizing? Let's see how Heidegger characterizes the authentic present. What he calls the *moment of vision* ('*Augenblick*' in German) is the rapturous opening-out toward the current situation, an instance of being one's 'Da' in the most pronounced sense:

That *Present* which is held in authentic temporality and which is this *authentic* itself, we call the "*moment of vision*". This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but rapture which is *held* in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a phenomenon which *in principle* can not be clarified in terms of the "now". (SZ, 338)²⁷

²⁷In the German original, this passage reads thus: "Die in der eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit gehaltene, mithin *eigentliche Gegenwart* nennen wir den *Augenblick*. Dieser Terminus muß im aktiven Sinne als Ekstase verstanden werden. Er meint die entschlossene, aber in der Entschlossenheit *gehaltene* Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen

503 The moment of vision is Dasein's *moving-out-toward* the concrete situation: the
 504 authentic making-present of what matters here and now.²⁸ This does not mean that
 505 there is a moment of time – a very short span like the blink of an instantaneous
 506 'now' – *during which* a certain orientation toward the situation takes place. Rather,
 507 it is the other way around: The moment of vision is what first enables the authentic
 508 encountering of entities.²⁹ Heidegger here effectively refers to what he also calls the
 509 *Entschluss* – the 'resolution' in and through which Dasein *unlocks* itself toward
 510 the situation in order to be fully 'there'.³⁰ This entails a genuine 'having' of one's
 511 time as opposed to the 'losing oneself' (and one's time) in the inauthentic rush of
 512 being 'dragged along' by the world, as illustrated in the example of 'curiosity' (inau-
 513 thentic present), characterized by a nervous inability/unwillingness to hold onto
 514 what is presently encountered (cf. SZ, § 68c).

515 Only quite derivatively, through the process of assigning dates [*Datierung*], i.e.
 516 associating worldly events with recurring 'objective' time markers (day and night,
 517 the sun's position etc.), and subsequently through the establishment of conventional
 518 time measures (clocks), quantifiable spans of time are established and imposed
 519 upon the intersubjective world of everyday affairs. The concrete measuring and
 520 reckoning with distinct time spans is thus a derivative, *fallen* manifestation of
 521 Dasein's temporality (cf. SZ, § 79). It is 'fallen' insofar as the dealing with explicit
 522 time spans – asking 'how long will this take?' or 'how much time do I have for
 523 that?' etc. – tends to close us off from the immediacy of being-in-the-situation.
 524 While in the moment of vision, I won't bother with questions of time or timing.
 525 When truly in the moment, *I am my time*.³¹

begegnet. Das Phänomen des Augenblicks kann *grundsätzlich nicht* aus dem *Jetzt* aufgeklärt werden." (SZ, 338)

²⁸ Heidegger distinguishes between *Situation* and *Lage* – in short, situation is disclosed by the authentic present, i.e. in the *Augenblick*, while *Lage* (roughly, the *general* instead of the *concrete* situation) is disclosed by the inauthentic present, i.e. in everyday (fallen) enpresenting. See Schear 2013 for an illuminating discussion of this contrast.

²⁹ "In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-toward, the moment of vision enables us to *encounter for the first time* what can be 'in time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. (SZ, 338 – translation slightly modified).

³⁰ A more detailed explication of the *Augenblick* is provided by Heidegger in the course of his discussion of boredom in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* – not surprisingly, the moment of resolution is exactly the counter move to profound boredom in which the ecstatic character of time is leveled into a dulling, self-same monotony (see GA 29/30, e.g. 223f).

³¹ In his highly illuminating 1924 Marburg talk "The Concept of Time", Heidegger puns: „die Zeit zu berechnen hat die Zeit eigentlich keine Zeit“ (GA 64, 119), adding that this is all one might correctly say about the theme of 'measuring' and explicitly 'reckoning' with regard of authentic time. In other words, in authentic temporalizing, Dasein is so busy *being itself* that it literally has no time to bother with 'time'. That is also why authentic Dasein in an important sense always 'has time', and cannot possibly be bored (cf. *ibid.*).

4 The Temporality of Findingness

526

At long last, we are now in a position to return to findingness in order to undertake its re-interpretation in terms of temporality. Very often, philosophical work on Heideggerian affectivity stops short of an in-depth discussion of temporality. One recent example is the otherwise excellent reconstruction of mood in *Being and Time* by Matthew Ratcliffe (2013a). While very precise in his discussion of all materials from Division I, Ratcliffe deals with mood's temporal character only in a tiny section at the end of the paper, a section that he moreover mostly uses to discuss the altered temporal experience in conditions of severe depression. This is insightful in its own right, but falls significantly short of an appreciation of the overall importance of the temporal re-interpretation of the care-structure performed in Division II.³²

The task, though complex, is straightforward. Findingness is to be illuminated as to its temporal constitution. This is part of the larger undertaking to re-interpret the entirety of the care-structure in terms of original temporality, a task Heidegger sets himself in SZ, § 68. From Division I we know that care is an essentially unitary fabric consisting of understanding, findingness, falling and discourse. Its unity in making up the being of Dasein had previously been characterized as *being-ahead-already-in-(a world)-as-being-amidst-(innerworldly entities)* (SZ, 192). Stated thus, the care-structure wears its temporal character almost on its sleeves: *being-ahead* (understanding; projection) corresponds to originary future or 'coming-toward', *being-already-in* (findingness; thrownness) corresponds to originary past or 'beenness', while *being-amidst* (falling) corresponds to originary present or 'enpresenting'.³³ Noting this much, it is crucial to keep in mind that while each constituent of care does bring a unique aspect to the overall structure and can certainly be *thematized* separately, we are dealing with an essentially *unitary* configuration. That means that there is no understanding that is not *also* at the same time a mode of findingness and *also* at the same time a form of falling (or 'being in the moment'), and likewise that there is no instance of findingness that is not also understanding and not also falling. Accordingly, Heidegger reminds his readers of just that to start § 68: "Every understanding has its mood. Every findingness is one in which one understands. The attuned understanding has the character of falling. The understanding which has its mood attuned in falling, articulates itself as to its intelligibility in discourse" (SZ, 335 – translation modified).

With the explication of originary temporality as the sense of care in hand, we see now somewhat clearer why this must be so. As a finite dimension of ecstatic encountering, stretched out between birth (thrownness) and death (ownmost possibility),

³² My more specific objection to Ratcliffe's treatment of the temporality of mood is that he fails to appreciate the way mood itself is unfolding *as* ecstatic temporality. Making the correct claim, as Ratcliffe does, that "mood changes can significantly alter *how* time is experienced" (2013a, 173) is not an objection to Heidegger's account. Rather, the fact that this is so is a consequence of the more basic fact that, prior to that, mood itself is constituted, along with understanding and falling, by original temporality. In which way exactly this is so will be clarified in the present section.

³³ Again, I leave out 'discourse' for reasons of simplicity.

562 the being of Dasein is played out with merciless inevitability as a precarious
 563 dynamic of bounded running-ahead. In every instance of its coming to itself, Dasein
 564 finds itself *already-in* – fatefully delivered over to – what is factually ‘there’, while
 565 at the same time *thrusting-forth* into possible ways to be. The forever unattainable
 566 but constantly looming ‘*no more*’ of death summons Dasein at each moment into
 567 that fateful rush that is its own being: steadily running ahead, never to arrive, never
 568 fully ‘at home’. ‘Understanding’ is this thrusting-forth into the unattainable being-
 569 that-is-to-come (being-possible), while *Befindlichkeit* is this being brought back
 570 upon the being-that-has-been (i.e., that *still is*, factually). However, for the most
 571 part and usually, Dasein ‘forgets’ [*vergißt*] its beenness and remains ‘unaware’
 572 [*ungewärtig*] of its coming toward while all the more thoroughly abandoning
 573 itself to what is immediately at hand. It succumbs to what is manifest here and now,
 574 gets taken in by routinely dealing with the things in reach. When this happens, the
 575 ecstases of having-been and coming toward are modified so that the ecstasis of
 576 making-present assumes dominance.³⁴

577 Now, from this it is clear that Heidegger will characterize findingness in terms of
 578 a specific salience of ‘beenness’ [*Gewesenheit*]. Heidegger puts it thus: finding
 579 oneself in one’s thrownness is a *being-brought-back onto* [*Zurückbringen-auf*] *oneself*,
 580 i.e. in a mood, Dasein’s *having-been* (i.e. what Dasein has been so that it ended up
 581 *here*) is accentuated, i.e. somehow ‘brought home to one’. That is the temporal
 582 sense in which findingness is disclosing the ‘that’ of Dasein’s thrownness:

583 Bringing Dasein *face to face* with the “that-it-is” of its own thrownness – whether authentically
 584 revealing or inauthentically covering it up – becomes existentially possible only if Dasein’s
 585 being, by its very meaning, constantly *is* as having been.

586 The thesis that ‘one’s findingness is grounded primarily in having been’ means that the
 587 existentially basic character of moods lies in *bringing one back to* something. This bringing-
 588 back does not first produce a having been; but in any attunement some mode of having been
 589 is made manifest for existential analysis. (SZ, 340)

590 This is what ‘being affected by something’ comes down to: Something in the
 591 world, immediately present or looming in the future, becomes manifest in such a
 592 way that it makes me ‘roll back upon myself’ so to speak, revealing – either in an
 593 instant or in a longer sequence of becoming attuned – what I cannot deny I am. John
 594 Haugeland put this peculiar situation-specific standing on one’s ‘having-been’ in
 595 the fitting form of a sigh: “Well, I guess we’ll just have to go on from *here*”
 596 (Haugeland 2013, 234).³⁵ This catchphrase captures the existential gist of thrownness
 597 as it conveys both the burdensome character of finding oneself situated and the
 598 inevitability of having to go on. The ‘here’ refers to the salient aspects of what we
 599 have factually become so that we ended up where we’re at and thus what we will
 600 have to ‘drag along’ when moving forward. Superficially, one might here tend to
 601 think of the *sum-total* of what has let us end up where we’re currently at. But to say

³⁴ Cf. the striking description of curiosity [*Neugier*] as an example for the temporal constitution of falling (inauthentic enpresenting) in SZ, § 68c.

³⁵ In light of Haugeland’s nice gloss, Dreyfus’ somewhat clumsy but insightful suggestion to translate *Befindlichkeit* as “where-we’re-at-ness” becomes intelligible (Dreyfus 1991, 168).

'sum-total' would be mistaken, as one's 'beenness' will never figure as a mere sum, as if it were an additive collection of past life events or of characteristics that one has so far accrued over one's lifetime. Instead, one's beenness is manifest as *summoned toward* projection, and is thus disclosed according to its relevance for a prospective way of going on. At no point does one's beenness figure as a mere collection of features, and at no point does it appear in isolation from projection and enpresenting. One's affectively disclosed thrownness is the burdensome 'drag' that grounds projection, i.e. the existential inevitability of projection unfolding within a *factual* space of possibilities that one cannot shake free of. Thus, findingness reveals the haunting inevitability of our factual being, the full acknowledgement of which we will for the most part have already avoided in routine absorption in some worldly issue or other.

This is important to note, once again: Usually, one will all but directly confront the 'here' from which, alas, one *has to* go on. The 'here' that is our factual situatedness weighs upon us in such a way that we mostly drift away from it and can take things lightly instead. It is a big part of the difficulty of capturing the point of Heidegger's understanding of findingness: that the burdensome 'weighing' of facticity is for the most part manifest as what seems like its phenomenological opposite – namely, as a tendency to drift away and take things lightly (dispersion, falling).³⁶ This describes the peculiar character of affective disclosure, i.e. a mode of disclosure that is exactly not a form of lucid awareness, but rather an avoidant turning-away. What is predominantly 'there' in findingness is that which we are *not* making clear to us, which we will *not* confront explicitly. But it lurks nevertheless, as long as *Dasein* is at all, since at any time *Dasein* "reposes in the weight of it", i.e. in the weight of the "basis of its potentiality-for-being" (SZ, 284).

Heidegger's favorite examples can help us get the basic points of the explication straight: fear, anxiety, and boredom. Fear is paradigmatic as an everyday inauthentic and thus fundamentally evasive mood; in the exceptional case of anxiety – almost never attained in its pure form – we see the opposite of this, as we gain from anxiety a simplified insight into the temporality of the care-structure; while boredom – perhaps the most spectacular example, and likewise quite rare in its purest manifestation of 'profound' boredom – fuses the three ecstases of temporality into the virtually unbearable experience of crystalline duration: the *long while* bringing to evidence time's tangible character as the finite span that is 'me' in each case: *Jeweiligkeit*. At this point, however, I will restrict the exposition to fear and anxiety, as these are the examples Heidegger focuses on throughout *Being and Time*.³⁷

³⁶From a fallen, present-day vantage point, it can seem that Facebook had to be invented for that dispersing routine evasion, and it is quite telling that there is an ongoing debate on the pros and cons of timelines, clear-name identity profiles and data protection rules: Can social media move from the burdensome drag of identity fixation and the evasive dispersing in our making dead time pass toward a more lively, presentist, *Augenblick*-like unfolding?

³⁷What Heidegger chiefly deals with in SZ, § 68b is the basic temporal structure of findingness, he is not yet concerned with the phenomenology of 'lived duration' – i.e. as the concrete ways in that the 'historizing' [*Geschehen*] of *Dasein* unfolds (see SZ, §§ 73–75, most notably pp. 386 and 390/1), and this is what is much more pronounced in the experience of boredom, and notably in

638 Fear, as Heidegger had already described in SZ, § 30, simultaneously discloses
 639 some innerworldly entity as threatening and Dasein's being-in-... as threatened.
 640 Now we can see clearer how this is so, and why the self-disclosing pole of beenness
 641 is the dominant one in this mode of temporalizing. In fearing a danger, one is indeed
 642 'awaiting' a potentially detrimental future event – but only insofar as one "lets what
 643 is threatening *come back* to one's factically concerned potentiality-for-being" (SZ,
 644 341). And for that to be possible at all, the ground to which one 'comes back to' in
 645 being-threatened must already be "ecstatically open" (ibid.): a danger can only
 646 impact, i.e.: *affect* an entity that is in the mode of *concernful* orientedness-toward,
 647 an entity whose mode of being is care. But what is characteristic of fear is that this
 648 impacting of the danger does not summon Dasein into a composed mode of
 649 confrontation-readiness, but rather the opposite: evasion, forgetfulness, confusion –
 650 Dasein lets the danger 'come back to itself' exactly by losing itself in the confusion
 651 of the moment:

652 This depression [*Gedrückttheit*] forces Dasein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that
 653 this thrownness gets closed off. The bewilderment is based upon a forgetting. When one
 654 forgets and backs away in the face of a factual potentiality-for-being which is resolute, one
 655 clings to those possibilities of self-preservation and evasion which one has already discovered
 656 circumspectively beforehand. When concern is afraid, it leaps from next to next,
 657 because it forgets itself and therefore does not *take hold of any definite possibility*. (SZ, 342)

658 Beenness figures in fear inauthentically as a forgetting – we lose ourselves in
 659 fear, exactly in *no longer knowing what or who we are* (i.e. what we have been),
 660 while the future figures inauthentically as a fearful 'awaiting' [*gewärtigen*] and not
 661 as authentic forerunning, while enpresenting [*gegenwärtigen*] appears as a nervous
 662 leaping from one occasional possibility of evasion or precaution to the next without
 663 firmly holding on to any. The burden of our beenness is 'there' in fear, but only as
 664 what *we cannot* get summoned straight in the face of the danger that is imminent.

665 In anxiety, all this is modified radically. Anxiety is not occasioned by an inner-
 666 worldly danger, but it springs from Dasein itself – arising out of being-in-the-world
 667 (cf. SZ, 344). Dasein itself is what anxiety is both 'anxious about' and 'anxious for'
 668 (so much was already discussed in SZ, § 40). Anxiety highlights in a flash of clarity
 669 the existential predicament of thrown being-toward-death. While in anxiety all
 670 innerworldly entities have lost their significance and all worldly possibilities are
 671 gone – circumpective concern "clutches at the "nothing" of the world" (SZ, 343) –,
 672 the naked 'there' of Dasein's thrown being-possible stands out in clear relief. In
 673 terms of temporality, beenness is no longer evaded but is now manifestly 'there' as
 674 that which Dasein is ready to repeat: "anxiety brings one back to one's thrownness
 675 as something *possible* which *can be repeated*" (ibid.). In anxiety, Dasein gains an
 676 ultimate composure – albeit in the disillusioned form of now facing up to the uncanniness
 677 of thrown being-toward-death, i.e. disclosing itself as delivered over to an
 678 unrelenting, alien world (contingency, insignificance, finitude): "Dasein is all taken
 679 back to its naked uncanniness, and becomes enthralled by it [*von ihm benommen*]"

profound boredom as described in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. See Hoffman 2005 for a helpful discussion.

(SZ, 344). But instead of fleeing the bleakness of this unsparing disclosure, anxious Dasein is brought face-to-face with *authentic* being-possible. Anxiety clears away all dispersing, distracting, ultimately irrelevant activities so that Dasein's temporality can assume its authentic guise: Dasein is brought back to its ownmost thrownness in such a way that it is ready to 'repeat itself', i.e. be prepared to 'exercise itself' *again* – or colloquially put: *being yourself*. Authentic enpresenting is thereby enabled, although not yet lived, since anxiety only "holds the moment of vision *at the ready (auf dem Sprung)*" (SZ, 344). Heidegger puts the upshot of the temporal interpretation of anxiety as follows:

When understood temporally, this 'mounting' [*Aufsteigen*] of anxiety out of Dasein means that the future and the present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial being-as-having-been [*Gewesenheit*] in the sense of bringing us back to repeatability. But anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him *from* possibilities which 'count for nothing', and lets him become *free* for those which are authentic. (ibid.)

It is time to pull the threads together. The exceptional mood of anxiety only highlights in stark relief what according to Heidegger is true of all modes of findingness. Moods are various ways in which the being that exists as thrown projection – as care – is intrinsically modified from its ground up. That 'ground' is not a thing or fact but the dimension of 'beenness' in each case of Dasein – namely, that Dasein is inevitably always already 'there' and 'this' as finite being-possible in (or rather: *as*) a specific historical situation. Though beenness is dominant and characteristic in findingness, being-affected is only possible as the ecstatic interplay of all three care-constituents. Something is presently encountered as mattering in so far as it brings us back upon our factic ground which itself "is" only as always already summoned toward resolute projection or dispersed in inauthentic falling. This modifiable dynamic of the temporal ecstases moreover unfolds as 'lived time', the qualitatively modifiable duration that is the concrete 'how' of being-in-the-world. The temporality of affectivity is not a mere phenomenological coloring of an underlying content-bearing process, but it is that which makes it the case that Dasein can encounter anything at all.

Conclusion

What did we learn about Heideggerian affectivity? Chiefly, that it is the dimension of 'groundedness' in a being that exists as finite being-possible, where this groundedness must be explicated as the various ways in which a concrete past is manifestly 'lived' – namely, as being summoned toward a nascent future by way of modes of present engagement. For the philosophical study of affectivity this has an immediate consequence: Neither can affectivity as such in any meaningful way be thematized in isolation from the other moments of existence – understanding, falling and discourse – nor can a

(continued)

single instance of affect (a specific mode of findingness in its concrete unfolding) be adequately thematized without the broader mode of engagement (concernful being-in-the-world) to which it makes a non-separable contribution. These are not just conceptual demands, not just pleas for a conceptual holism as opposed to an atomism of faculties (although it is that too). Instead, it is above all a plea for concreteness: There is no affectivity 'as such', but affectivity is in each case *mine* and thus in each case *this* (concrete weighing of *this* existential beenness on *this* particular projection etc.). And this 'customization' of affectivity pertains not just to the immediacy of concrete biographical situations, but crucially to the diachronic uniqueness of a life history and thus a particular self-understanding. Affectivity can only be understood as the in each case individual appropriation or *failure* to appropriate *this particular life* in the light of a concrete future that it is resolutely driving (or blindly dwindling) toward. However, 'this particular life' or 'life history' is, though thoroughly individual (as the 'irreplacability' of Dasein in the face of death makes clear), still a *historical* life, nay, it even *is* history as such: ecstatic temporality – as a fundamental 'being outside of itself' – ensures that each individual life is itself that as which history is played out. Dasein is not somehow 'placed' in a history (as an objective, impersonal current of events), but it is the instance through which, or rather: *as which* history itself unfolds.³⁸

Before this long journey comes to a close, this may be the place to reflect upon the seeming tendency in Heidegger's exposition to stress what conventionally is deemed to be 'negative' affectivity. Fear, anxiety, boredom, the burdensome weighing of facticity upon Dasein, the seemingly unbearable certainty of death, and so forth – not exactly a cheerful assortment, or so it might seem.³⁹ But we have to tread carefully here. As we have seen in section II above, from the perspective of the existential analytic everything here depends upon the existence-enabling role of death as the indeterminate certainty of the impossibility of the being of Dasein. The ever looming and ultimately certain possibility of Dasein's impossibility is what anchors the care-structure

³⁸ I did not deal much with the relationship between originary temporality and history in this paper, but from my treatment it should be clear enough – at least in outline – what Heidegger is driving at in this regard. See SZ, §§ 74 and 75.

³⁹ Only for reasons of space I did not discuss the way Heidegger applies his analysis to more 'positive' modes of findingness. Toward the end of SZ, § 68b, he notably analyses hope, maybe in order to contrast the 'negative' moods of fear and anxiety with a positive one, and again the aim is to show that it is 'beenness' that figures prominently, i.e. self-disclosure ahead of world-disclosure. According to Heidegger, in hoping for something I not merely anticipate some *future* boon but I do so precisely in "hoping something *for me*" [*Sich-erhoffen*], i.e. I bring *myself to bear* in my hope, so that beenness again dominates in thrusting "*myself* toward what I hope for" (SZ, 345). Here, as in other conventionally 'positive' emotions, my inescapable 'having been' is temporarily set free of its burdensome character – as long as I am in the mood of hope I am relieved of *the burden* of being me (not of *being* me, obviously). The same goes for joy, enthusiasm, elation and so on.

and is thus what makes possible the essentially futural temporalizing of Dasein as 'being-ahead...' – as 'fore-running toward death'. But here is the crux of the matter: The basic existential condition of finitude need not have any *concrete, existentiell* bearing upon the de-facto *quality* of a person's affectivity. Our being thrown into death does not weigh the scales toward an ultimately more grim, anxious, depressed sort of life. All that is said is that the facing-up to the ultimate existential predicament is the condition for an authentic 'being there' (in the moment of vision) as opposed to an inauthentic 'being away' (absorbed in some distraction or other). Now, one *might* probably say, with this basic existential make-up of Dasein in view, that something along the lines of an anxiety-ready quasi-depressive realism would come closer to the ultimate existential "truth" than an ever-cheerful, unburdened 'love of life'. But even that would be quite a stretch, and all too easily amount to a misreading of resolute fore-running as somehow necessarily grim or manifestly 'painful'. In fact, readiness-for-anxiety can not only go together with, but is probably best exemplified by the greatest of blissful immersions in the current situation. Heidegger himself certainly says this much, for example in the remarkable closing passage of *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*:

Transposed into the possible, [man] must constantly be at guard [versehensein] concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus at guard [versehen] and transposed [versetzt] can he become seized by terror [sich entsetzen]. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment [Seligkeit des Staunens] – being torn away in the wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing, and which the greats among philosophers called *enthousiasmos* – as witnessed by the last of the greats, Friedrich Nietzsche, in that song of Zarathustra's which he called *das trunkene Lied* and in which we also experience what the world is. (GA 29/30, 531/2 – Engl. tr. 366)

The *enthousiasmos* is the paradigm ecstatic temporalizing in which the world is 'there' in the full energetic and self-consuming sense, which is, ultimately, what Heidegger drives at with his choice of a term for the being that we ourselves are: *Da-sein*.

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