

Chapter 3

Emotions and the extended mind

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Extended mind theory (henceforth EM), a currently much discussed approach in the philosophy of cognitive science, revolves around the claim that some of our mental processes are physically realized in part by structures or processes in our environment (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2010). For example, tools such as computers or notebooks are said to literally extend the mind on condition that the agent reliably “couples” to them in performing cognitive tasks. Coupling is understood as a form of reciprocal causal interaction with the external item that reliably leads to enhanced cognitive performances—ones that the agent on its own would be incapable of carrying out. Further candidate mind extensions are various features of embodiment, forms of agency—such as action that adaptively re-structures one’s epistemic environment, certainly language, and even social institutions such as the legal system (see Gallagher & Crisafi, 2009).

So far, EM theorizing has been silent with regard to emotions and affective states. Most proponents of EM assume a sharp divide between cognitive states and qualitative experiential states. While these theorists hold that all or most of what belongs to an individual’s cognition may be distributed widely within the technical and social environment, they consider *conscious experience* to be exclusively a matter of processes in the brain (Clark, 2009). Upon closer examination of a variety of typical human emotions and affects in their usual situatedness, this assumption seems premature. In fact, there are plenty of environmental structures that may function as *scaffolds* of emotional experience (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009; Krueger, 2011; Wilutzky, Stephan, & Walter, 2011), and, as I undertake to show, this is the case even to such an extent that *qualitative* emotional experiences are enabled that would not be realizable in the absence of these environmental structures. Many of our emotional experiences contain an element of phenomenal fusion or coupling—in face-to-face interaction, in a person’s immersion in a group, or in the absorbed beholding of a work of art. Notably, collective emotions seem promising candidates for extended emotions: The affective dynamics pertaining to a group profoundly transforms the individual group member’s emotional experience. Could this process reach the point at which entirely *novel* emotional processes are constituted? This would be a case where goes-on on the group level would function as a phenomenal extension of an individual’s emotions.¹ It is the guiding question for the present

¹ See also Schmid (Chapter 1, this volume) and Krueger (Chapter 11, this volume).

chapter whether experiences of these kinds might be accommodated into a revised extended mind framework.

To the EM orthodoxy, the very idea of extended emotion will seem like a violation of basic assumptions. On the other hand, EM is in crucial respects inadequate in the eyes of phenomenologists, philosophers of emotion, and enactivists, despite the attractiveness of its founding idea (viz., that human minds are technologically and socially distributed instead of locked into individual skulls). EM has almost nothing to say about conscious experience—a dimension that is constitutive of minds like ours. In light of this, it is worthwhile to explore a potential revision of the EM framework so that it may encompass emotions and other phenomenal experiences.

My chapter starts with a characterization of the “gist” of human emotion in phenomenological and neo-existentialist terms. Next, I provide a sketch of the envisioned conception of extended emotion, making transparent some assumptions and the motivation behind it. The following section is devoted to align EM more closely with enactivism. The section ends with an initial attempt to make the transition from enactive to non-trivially extended emotion in terms of *phenomenal coupling*. In the last part, I provide a sketch of socio-normative scaffolding of emotion before I further elucidate phenomenal coupling, with a focus on intercorporeal interaction and affective atmospheres.

The gist of emotion

Try to think of a hypothetical being utterly lacking (the capacity for) emotion. What, at root, would this being lack? What is it about a robot or about Mr. Spock that sets them apart from us? I think John Haugeland (1998) sketches the way to an adequate answer when he characterizes computers as follows: “The trouble with artificial intelligence is that computers don’t give a damn!” (p. 47). *Giving a damn*, having something matter, genuine caring for something or someone—that is an excellent attempt at capturing, in a nutshell, something like the “essence” of emotion, or rather: of *emotionality* as the general capacity for experiencing distinct emotional states or processes. Haugeland’s answer comes to this: In a fundamental way, emotions endow our lives with *existential value*—they are both the ultimate sources and the situational manifestation of existential significance, the very dimension of meaning that is inextricable from a human life.² Having (the capacity for) emotion is having something matter to one in this quite basic, value-constituting sense.³

Haugeland’s answer can be spelt out as follows. Emotions are obviously *intentional* as we are usually emotional *about something*, at the same time they are in some fundamental

² For the sake of brevity, I don’t distinguish here—as Bennett Helm (2001) helpfully does—between the value-constitutive powers of emotionality in general and the value-tracking capacities of individual emotions. Solomon (1976) likewise advocates an account of emotion that stresses their value-constituting capacities.

³ In Slaby (2008a), I unpack Haugeland’s slogan in detail and use it as the linchpin of an encompassing “neo-existentialist” account of emotion; further partial articulations of my emotion-theoretic position are in Slaby (2008b) and Slaby and Stephan (2008).

sense *evaluative* as their objects are matters of non-indifference to us, and, importantly, in virtue of the preceding, they are intimately *self*-involving and *self*-owned: the capacity for emotion manifests and tracks not just any meaning, but *existential* meaning—things that matter specifically *to us*, issues *we are* involved in, matters from which we cannot detach without giving up something that is of utmost concern to us. This is also why emotions are not just contingently but constitutively involved with *agency*, insofar as an agent to whom things genuinely matter is *ipso facto*, barring contravening circumstances, motivated to act accordingly. Emotions either directly phase over into action or come with a strong inclination to act in line with their evaluative disclosure of the situation at hand.

In virtue of all this, emotions are among the fundamental “sources of the self”—they constitute the very dimension in which things *can* concern us or *be* an issue for us. Take a person’s emotionality away, and there’s nothing left that deserves to be called “self”—no valuing, no motivation, no agency, just a colorless plain condition. Emotionality consists in a fundamental, inseparable unity of evaluation, intentionality, agency, and self-involvement. This is the reason why neither cognitivism nor feeling theories about emotion can be right, and why a multi-component theory that views the components as separable elements cannot be adequate in more than a superficially descriptive way. Instead, at the center of emotion is a *sui generis* way of a person’s relating to the world: *affective intentionality* (see, e.g., Döring, 2007; Goldie, 2000; Helm, 2001; Slaby & Stephan, 2008).

With this inextricability of the dimensions of content and quality, emotions make a mess of the neat separation of the intentional and the phenomenal that is a default assumption in much of the current philosophy of mind. Emotions are intentional-phenomenal hybrids: *Giving a damn*—having things matter to you—is an intrinsically “hot,” phenomenal, hedonic, and action-oriented way of relating to the world.

But how might *this* possibly be extended? How can my self-involved caring about something be partly constituted by a process or structure “out there” in the world? This basic affective dimension seems to be exactly what qualifies some states as *my own*, and thus intuitively seems to be something “in me,” instead of something “out there.” Haugeland (rightly, in my view) thinks that *giving a damn*, what he also calls existential commitment, is the mark of the mental, it is what constitutes *underived* or *intrinsic* intentionality (see Haugeland, 1998, pp. 291–304). Only that which is under the scope of my existential commitment and thus participates in my concerned caring for my own being and for all that is relevantly associated with it, is genuinely owned, only then it genuinely belongs to me as a subject, and therefore can count as mental in an underived sense.

But to conclude from this subject-constituting power that all that belongs to one’s emotionality has to be “internal” in a spatial sense is to succumb to prejudice, namely, to the assumption that what is truly subjective just *has to* be physically inside the individual organism. This is far from evident. The crude, locational interiority or exteriority of an organism—a system that constitutively depends on high-bandwidth exchange with its environment—is not obviously the scale at which matters about the physical realization

of phenomenal subjectivity are settled (which is an empirical question that so far seems wide open, see Hurley, 2010).

Extending emotion—motivation and basic idea

To many, extended emotion will still seem an eccentric idea. Extended *cognition* is controversial enough, so talking about extending emotions might seem even more counter-intuitive.⁴

Exploring this possibility is relevant for two reasons. First, the strict separation of the cognitive from the emotional that is a premise of most current EM cannot be upheld. As we have seen, emotionality is not only integral to minds like ours, but it is also not separable from other kinds of mental state, such as perception or cognition. A theory of the mind that is silent about affectivity leaves out something essential about the mental as such and thus risks being fundamentally misguided. A strict separation of cognitive intentionality from affective experience seems problematic also in light of what research in the affective sciences indicates (see, e.g., Barrett & Bar, 2009; Damasio, 1999; Davidson, 2000).

The second reason is this: Current discussions of EM are often strikingly disconnected from the phenomenology of human mental life. Most of the time, the discussion takes off from entirely theoretical considerations, starting from conceptual distinctions that are not tied back to an analysis of how our mental lives unfold naturally and pre-theoretically. This phenomenological deficit is set to come back to haunt the theoretical proposals—rendering them unintuitive and abstract. For example, what starts out as an innocent conceptual *distinction*—as that between the cognitive and the emotional—can easily come to be treated as an ontological *separation*, so that at some point the idea of purely “cold,” unemotional cognition seems natural, which is a clear mistake. Minimally, valid theorizing about the mind, while not necessarily tied to a phenomenological approach as its prime method, should not blatantly *disregard* phenomenological observations about how actual, real-life experience unfolds. Better still is an approach that employs phenomenology from the outset, letting it inform conceptual distinctions and even suggest experimental designs in the mind sciences (Gallagher, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2008; Thompson, 2007).

Adopting a phenomenological stance can bring in view some *prima facie* indications that something like extended emotion is in fact happening regularly. Some of our emotional experiences are such that their quality, intensity, and dynamics seem to come to a significant extent from without. In these cases, *a part of the world* is what sets up, drives, and energizes our emotional experience. Watching a breath-taking opera performance that moves us to tears, dynamically framing the entirety of our experiential space for a certain period of time. Being drawn into euphoria on an exuberant party, amongst a crowd of enthusiastic dancers whose dynamic movements and overflowing excitement literally take hold of our lived body, making us move in the rhythm of the crowd, feeling

⁴ For thorough critiques of the EM framework, see Adams and Aizawa (2001) and Rupert (2004). Much of the ongoing controversy is documented in Menary (2010).

immersed and connected. Getting worked up into intense rage amidst a furious mob of protestors, being drawn into aggressive shouts and movements, ready to fight or otherwise engage an opponent. In these cases, the social environment provides more than just stimuli or elicitors of “inner states.” Rather, situation and feeling are inextricable; gestalt features of the environment and our embodied experience fuse into one another, and this is also inextricable from our readiness and willingness to act, including our sense of ability, of strength and control, and thus might move us to do or try things we wouldn’t otherwise so much as consider or think about.

A different kind of case is where we ourselves provide the external consolidation for an emotional episode, through an emphatic act that helps us turn an initially inchoate feeling into a determinate type of emotion, such as when we confront or attack an offender to give clearer shape to our mounting anger. Novelist Robert Musil (1978) called acts of this kind “Gefühlshandlungen”—*emotional actions* that can serve to bring determinacy into our affective lives. These emotional actions seem not entirely unlike what is discussed as “epistemic action” by EM theorists (see Clark, 2008, pp. 70–81; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Emotional action can clarify both the eliciting situation, which might be opaque at first, and one’s own evaluative stance toward that situation, which might be indeterminate initially. In addition, however, emotional action is often governed by the potentially skewed “logic” of a specific type of emotion—such as confrontation in the case of rage, retreat or hiding in the case of shame, flight in the case of fear, depressive avoidance of contact in the case of grief, etc.

At least in some such cases, we find ourselves with emotions we would be utterly incapable of experiencing in the absence of the environmental structures or without the actions that help solidify these emotions. Thus, it seems that there are “tools for feeling”—including emotional acts and strategies—in something like the way there are “tools for thinking” in EM theorizing (Clark, 2002; Dennett, 2000; see also Slaby et al., 2006). Does the agent form a transient *coupled system* with these external structures by hooking onto them in emotional experience?

Phenomenologically, it can seem as if an environmental structure creeps in upon us, fills our experiential horizon and affects our bodily poise, our posture, our readiness and potentialities to act, and even the execution and style of our agency. We might have the feeling of temporarily “dissolving” into the crowd of protestors or party people on the dance floor, as our normal mental mode, composure, and default agency is radically transformed, sometimes approaching a trance-like state of absorption.

Usually, it is assumed that internalism about the vehicles enabling conscious experience is the default position, so that the onus is on proponents of externalism and EM to show that this is not so. But why is internalism the default position? This assumption might be questioned, or rather, its status might be changed from unquestioned prior commitment to testable explanatory hypothesis (Hurley, 2010). In this way, the burden of proof would not be assigned beforehand. The playing field on which externalists and internalists meet would be leveled, treating it as an *open question* whether the enabling machinery of emotional (and other) experiences is all in the head or not. Without robust evidence that

disfavored externalist explanations, a commitment to internalism would amount to the assumption of a “magical membrane,” separating and privileging what is inside our skulls from the rest of our body and the world (Hurley, 2010, pp. 103–105). Given the dense, continuous high-bandwidth reciprocal interaction between organism and environment (Haugeland, 1998, p. 220) and the current absence of even a working understanding of how conscious experience is brought about, such a privileging of physiological interiority seems contentious.

There are different versions of EM out there, so I should make clear what kind of approach to the extended mind I am favoring. I don't adhere to the so-called *parity principle*—where the candidate extension is some external item that plays the same functional role as a potential internal mental process and in virtue of this may count as mental itself (Clark, 2008, p. 77; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). The parity principle has caused much confusion and it is notoriously debated. Moreover, it is impossible to assign emotions clear-cut functional roles that capture all their relevant aspects. Therefore, it is better to adopt the “integrationist” approach to EM (Menary, 2006) that depicts the extended dynamics between organism and environment as forming a hybrid system—a system that gives rise to mental processes that the organism “on its own,” de-coupled from the relevant environmental structure, would be incapable of instantiating. Many of our real-life emotions are like dancing a waltz—you just can't do it on your own. The emoting agent is in dense, continuous interaction with some expressive environmental structure—such as an opera performance, or a brilliant orator giving a speech, or a crowd of protestors chanting rhythmically—which influences, through multiple channels, various bodily and neural processes so that an intensive emotional experience is generated, one that would be mischaracterized without invoking the external dynamic and expressive structure of the performance, speech, or protest.

This notion of interactive coupling brings this version of extended mind in close vicinity to enactivism. Emotions are excellent examples of the kinds of dynamic, embodied, and performative processes of “sense-making” that are featured by enactivists. Accordingly, this is where we have to look for considerations that can lead to a partial revision of EM.

Enaction rules extension

Enactivism—basics

Enactivism holds that the mental is a subclass of the processes of interaction and exchange between a self-organizing system and its environment—processes through which both living system and environment take shape and come into being as distinguishable (although not separable) entities, which means that both system and environment can only be properly specified in their dynamic mutuality. Mind is (a continuation of) life: a continuation of—and thus structured in some respects similar to—the metabolic process of a system's self-organization in exchange with appropriate environments (Thompson, 2007). Mental processes are thus essentially active, performative sequences of organism/environment interaction, and accordingly they are not intelligible in abstraction from what they relate

to. The mental is an interplay and intermingling of goings on in brain, body, and world. It is strictly relational so that it makes no sense to try to assign it a determinate location (Di Paolo, 2009). *Enaction rules extension*: Locational issues—the question of whether a mental process is physically “inside” or “outside”—are rendered meaningless. There is exchange, interaction, dense coupling—continuous process—but no determinate location, the continuous looping interaction of neuronal, bodily, and environmental processes is what instantiates mentality (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). The question then rather becomes one of relative intensity or temporary dominance: *What is leading the way* in a given mental episode, at a given time—is it the organism/agent and her intrinsic initiative, or is it some structure in the environment that originates a specific dynamic and takes the lead in the dance?

Enactive emotion

Emotions are the paradigm case of an enactive mental process (Colombetti & Thompson, 2008). Emotions epitomize the idea of goal-conductive “sense making”: the enactive agent strives for self-preservation and the fulfillment of other goals, both basic and non-basic—and thus needs to respond and react to what has salience and value in relation to these goals. Obviously, it makes no sense for an agent just to record or represent value features and stop there, but the agent has to *act* accordingly and pursue what it needs and avoid what may harm it. That is just what individual emotions do, on the most basic level—track salience and value in such a way as to directly initiate appropriate responses and actions, and follow through with them if possible, navigating environmental constraints.⁵

To enactivists, an emotional episode is an active, performative process—something we do as much as something we just passively undergo. Emotions are thus matters of *active striving*—or more precisely, modifications of processes of an agent’s active pursuit. It would be wrong to count them just as passive mental states (Slaby, Paskaleva, & Stephan, 2013).

As such active processes, emotions are a matter of the *lived body* in a Merleau-Pontyan sense: the body understood as a medium of engagement in the world and experience of the world. Body and world are densely attuned; there is a dynamic interplay and equipoise between the lived body and the world becoming manifest as an arena of significance, offering opportunities for engagement. A key characteristic of the lived body is that it manifests an agent’s concrete potentialities, embodying a practical world-orientation in the mode of “I can” or “I can’t,” at the same time providing instant kinesthetic and evaluative feedback on how one’s activities are going. These felt bodily potentialities provide the dynamic schemes through which the environment is apprehended—where the environment comes in view in terms of the affordances and solicitations it offers to the agent (Scarantino, 2003). The active lived body is thereby also a *feeling body*—a resonance field in which the successes or failures of one’s active pursuits as well as prospects and hindrances are registered immediately in the form of positive or negative feelings—affective

⁵ This is the slimmed down, biologically minimal version of the explication of the “essence of emotion” given earlier.

experience thus modifies embodied activity from within, keeping it oriented toward its goals (cf. Slaby, 2008b). It is this felt bodily dimension that anchors our life's fundamental character as a realm of and orientation toward significance. Thus this detour via enactivism brings us back to where we started with: to emotionality as the capacity of having something matter to us.

Where do we stand with regard to extended emotion? On the one hand, enactivism renders the extendedness of mental processes less surprising. In one sense of the term, to call mental processes "extended" is just to articulate the fact that they are processes spanning brain, body and world in continuous "high bandwidth"-coupling. If enactivism is right, a kind of default extendedness pertains to all mental processes (Di Paolo, 2009).

On the other hand, the processual and performative understanding of emotion provides a phenomenological counterpart to another founding thought of extended mind theory. In their seminal 1998 paper, Clark and Chalmers distinguished *active* externalism from the older semantic externalism, which is exclusively an externalism of the reference of linguistic expressions and mental content, not depending on a causally active, synchronic relation to the environment. While Clark and Chalmers mean by "active" not much more than *causally* active, it is not a big step to transform their active externalism into a richer *externalism of process*. It is not just any ongoing causal interaction between agent and environment, and also not just those that can be interpreted in terms of cognitive performances, but it also encompasses dynamic structural coupling that as such is manifest consciously. A part of the process dynamics of emotion can both originate and also be dynamically sustained and driven along by processes in the environment of the emoting person, as when one is moved to tears by a sad movie or pulled into anger and even active aggression by being under the sway of a fierce crowd. The minimal affective and agentic self that is the practical and hedonically salient lived body—the fundamental "I can" at the base of our embodied experience—is just this dynamically open structure, constitutively capable of being engaged and drawn in by dynamical goings-on in its surroundings.

Crucially, we have to think of this not only in terms of mundane examples such as Merleau-Ponty's description of a blind man's cane, a performance which might be only minimally related to affectivity (Froese & Fuchs, 2012; Gallagher, 2005; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 139). Instead, there are many cases where the body-schema-expanding engagement is from the outset one of intensive emotional involvement. Here, the *feeling* body is drawn into the act in a pronounced way, as the embodied engagement with the world is now a matter of being intensively *affected* by what one is involved with—the embodied engagement in these cases is inextricable from intensive emotional experiences whose dynamics, pace, intensity, hedonic tone, and action tendency are dictated from without: by the expressive dynamics of the theater play one is watching, by the behavior of the crowd one is immersed in, or by the affective dynamics displayed by one's interlocutor or opponent in a face-to-face exchange. These are cases of affective-phenomenal coupling and thus fully-fledged instances of extended emotion.

Extending emotion, steps toward a theory

Socio-normative interaction and participatory sense-making

Griffiths and Scarantino (2009) distinguish “diachronic scaffolding”—the longer-term shaping of emotions by cultural frames, scripts, templates (and one should add: *institutions* of emotion such as romantic love or the “culture of therapy” etc., see Illouz, 2007), from the synchronic scaffolding of emotion: the occurrent, “online” shaping of emotional experience by direct coupling and continuous interaction with the environment. While Griffiths and Scarantino only hint in passing at the phenomenal dimension of synchronic scaffolding, they provide a helpful account of other dimensions of the emotion’s situatedness. Before I turn to phenomenal coupling, a quick look at how emotions in general are shaped in social interaction can provide some relevant background.

Social interaction (be it face-to-face or individual-to-group) is of tremendous importance to the formation and development of individual emotions. Chains of coordinated responses between interactants—verbally, through mimics, gesture, posture, or other forms of bodily coordination—are often those which first crystallize an inchoate episode of feeling or affect into a stable form, into a nameable emotion. Without the interaction, many an affective episode would remain in an impoverished state—unstable and inarticulate, and thus remain at the level of mere affect instead of taking shape as an emotion proper (cf. Campbell, 1997, ch. 2).⁶ Ubiquitous social interaction practices are the natural setting in which the emotional actions described here take place, in the form of interactive exchange, or what enactivists call “participatory sense-making” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).

Importantly, these interactions not only have practical and phenomenological implications, but a crucial normative dimension as well. Emotions are not just shaped as a matter of fact, but also constituted as a *normative* reality—as matters that are subject to assessments of appropriateness. Helm speaks of emotional “commitments” and “entitlements” in the manner of Robert Brandom’s inferentialism (Helm, 2001). Once expressed and then reflected back and acknowledged by relevant others, I am *committed* to an emotion of a certain type and to rationally appropriate follow-up emotions—and the others are expected to hold me to my commitments by normative sanctioning. For example, it is normatively inappropriate *not* to feel happy or relieved after the danger that gave rise to one’s fear has been avoided. Our emotional lives are in this way situated in a normative social practice that provides an encompassing socio-normative scaffolding for our individual emotional episodes.⁷ Without the corresponding responses to my emotions

⁶ On the distinction between *affect*—in short, feelings not fully articulate and organized into recognizable, controllable, and intersubjectively accepted types of emotion—and *emotion* see Massumi (1995).

⁷ In fact, going this way could be another way of showing that the human mind, properly construed, cannot be conceived otherwise than as *vapidly*, almost trivially extended: mind, in the normative-pragmatic sense, *constitutively* depends on other minds and on communal norms established in and enforced by the pervasive practices of social interaction (see Crisafi & Gallagher, 2009).

by others, without the other's expectations and demands, without communally established rules of appropriateness, and without this dance-like interplay of dynamic embodied interaction, a person's emotional life would run a different, certainly impoverished, and unstable course. In all sorts of ways, individual emotions are *beholden* to the larger dynamic, interactive, and normative frameworks that partly shape and influence them.

But this is not all there is to the situatedness of emotion. So far, what has been described in this section predominantly concerned *structuring* factors of mental states, not their *triggering* or *driving* factors.⁸ Our mental states are embedded in pervasive structures of norms, habits, institutions, routine practices—not to forget language as the ultimate framework of human affairs. However, these kinds of scaffolding are just the indispensable backdrop of our mental lives. It is time to deal in more detail with the crucial dimension that alone warrants talk of fully-fledged *emotional* extension: the direct shaping of emotional experience in its immediate phenomenal richness.

Phenomenal coupling

Phenomenal coupling is the direct, online engagement of an agent's affectivity with an environmental structure or process that itself manifests affect-like, expressive qualities—be it in the form of an *affective atmosphere* (Anderson, 2009; Schmitz et al., 2011) or as a dynamic gestalt feature of a different kind, such as an *expressive quality* of a piece of music (Levinson, 2009). The most relevant range of examples is in the social-interactive domain: nothing is as emotionally engaging as the expressivity of fellow humans—individuals as well as groups can draw us into emotional experiences that we would not be able to experience on our own. Another key range of examples is found in contexts of art reception, as many of the emotions we experience in response to dynamic art-forms such as music, film, theater, or dance are likewise such that their full phenomenal quality cannot be characterized without recourse to the expressivity of the artworks themselves. Here, as in most interpersonal cases, what goes on in our environment is itself active and expressive, and we are obviously intimately attuned to certain expressive gestalt features in a way similar to how we respond to the expressed emotions and the manifested agency of fellow humans.

As shown in the “Enactive emotion” section, the agentive and experiential body schema that forms the ever-present background of experience is capable of expanding so as to incorporate structures in the environment, both in contexts of instrumental action and in contexts of emotional experience. The feeling body is a transparent, though evaluatively “tinted,” medium of emotional experience, and it is constitutively open to be affectively engaged in interaction. Froese and Fuchs (2012) provide a succinct account of how this might be played out in interpersonal interaction in the form of a dialogical interplay of expressions and impressions, with the lived body as a “felt resonance-board for emotion”

⁸ This distinction is deliberately reminiscent of Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering causes of behavior (see Dretske, 1988).

(Froese & Fuchs, 2012, p. 212). In these inter-affective exchanges, the manifested emotional expression (face, gesture, body posture, movement, etc.) of one interactant is apprehended by the other in the form of an affective bodily resonance. This in turn modifies the second person's expressivity, which is again experienced by the other, and thus a dialogical sequence of mutual corporeal attunement unfolds.⁹

A full-blown case of extended emotion would be one where an agent is “worked up” by another to such an extent that he comes to have an emotional experience outside the range of his normal emotional repertoire—such as when a contagious demagogue infects others with his particularly aggressive anger, making them feel in a more intense and expressively rich way, probably leading them to act in ways they later regret. Or consider the case where a joyful, pleasant, and accommodating person might temporarily transform the grim disposition—including a weak and disengaged bodily demeanor—of a mildly depressed person, cheering him up and enlivening him so that he comes to feel and act in ways hitherto precluded to him. Embodied emotional interaction in some cases can function almost like a string-play, as when the forceful expressivity of one partner in the interaction engages that of the other, initiating and then leading the way in an intercorporeal dance, scaffolding the other's emotions.

In these embodied interactions, a decisive vehicle for phenomenally extended emotion is the bodily expressivity of the person that comes to feel the enriched emotional state—what is first acted on in these interactions are facial expression, gesture, body posture, and overall bodily comportment. The natural assumption is that these enhanced expressions in turn give rise to a richer phenomenal experience. Krueger's (2009) description of patients suffering from Moebius syndrome—a paralysis of facial expression that goes along with a significantly diminished felt affectivity—points in this direction. The less I am able to express myself through the natural channels of embodied affectivity, the less I will be able to feel in situations of emotion. But there is a danger of stopping at this point, so that it can seem that the way emotional feelings are experienced is *just* a matter of quasi-Jamesian bodily sensations, a felt feedback of bodily changes (Prinz, 2004). While certainly a crucial ingredient, this affective bodily feedback does not provide all of the phenomenal characteristics of emotional experience. Instead, emotional experience—even in its immediately felt character—is an affective engagement with the world. In and through her emotion, the emoter apprehends and phenomenally experiences the situation she is in. And this is what happens in the embodied interactions that extend emotion: my emotional “vision” of what goes on around me is transformed in the interaction, the emotional feelings in questions are *feelings-towards* in Peter Goldie's sense (Goldie, 2000) and thus a form of affective world-disclosure.

To show in more detail how these world-disclosing feelings unfold in situations of possible extension, I will focus on one key intermediate phenomenon linking the feeling

⁹ Joel Krueger has likewise provided in-depth descriptions of affect-rich embodied interaction, and he helpfully invokes the concept of a “we-space” as the specific interpersonal realm that is created and then negotiated in these dialogical embodied exchanges (see Krueger, 2010).

body with the affectively apprehended environment: namely, affective atmospheres. Being gripped by an atmosphere is a case of phenomenal coupling to a structure in the environment that itself has dynamic phenomenal characteristics. In the present discussion, talk of affective atmospheres describes cases of phenomenal coupling by characterizing that which the coupling is to. For example, this is how the violently angry person *also* comes across in interaction: as someone radiating an atmosphere of energetic aggression—an atmosphere which is experienced as a field of force that is hard to withstand for those in its vicinity.¹⁰

Emotional atmospheres are pervasive: people, things, places are often surrounded by or “have” atmospheres, there is the expectant atmosphere of a conference room just before a big lecture begins, the tense atmosphere of a difficult meeting, the atmosphere of a building, or of a city, the atmosphere that surrounds an individual, or the atmosphere that predominates between friends or in a loving couple. Atmospheres often impress themselves on us, they can grip us with authority—as when we can’t help but feel tense in a group of stressed-out people.¹¹

Emotional atmospheres are *affective qualities in public space*—qualities realized in a distributed manner by several elements spread across a scenery, making up dynamic situational gestalts. They are experientially manifest as wholes, and their separate elements, if distinguishable at all, might be explicated only after the holistic impression has been received. As qualitative figurations of interpersonal space that are often purposefully arranged, atmospheres are the counterpart, on the side of phenomenal experience, of the “cognitive props and aids” that Clark so often invokes—not tools for thinking, but *tools for feeling*.

The fact that we can neutrally behold an atmosphere shows that they are not entirely experience-dependent. We can coldly register the jubilant atmosphere of a party while being sad and detached ourselves. Or we can, while being happy or euphoric, still grasp the sadness, irritation, or tension that envelopes a group of people on a funeral we are about to join (see Schmitz et al., 2011). Atmospheres are detachable from individual experience, and they are something that we can often agree upon intersubjectively, even between people that are differently attuned to them. This partial detachability is a precondition for viewing atmospheres as something that can be deployed as “mind tools”: they

¹⁰ The phenomenon of an emotional atmosphere is not unrelated to what is usually called “charisma.” They differ in that charisma is an affective dimension pertaining to a person whereas atmospheres are usually more marked and more situational, and not necessarily anchored in a person or group of persons (see also de Rivera, 1992).

¹¹ My reflections on atmospheres are indebted to the German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz, who has developed an encompassing phenomenology of the lived body, in which the concept of an atmosphere figures prominently (see, e.g., Schmitz et al., 2011). In sociology, de Rivera (1992) has done important groundwork. He helpfully distinguishes between emotional *climates*—stable collective emotions experienced in a society that reflect longer-term sociopolitical conditions—and emotional *atmospheres*, which are relatively short-term, situation-related affective experiences shared between members of a group.

are sufficiently external so that they might be deliberately evoked through design, architecture, decoration, etc. (see Anderson, 2009).

Atmospheric features of a situation impress themselves variously upon dimensions of the feeling body—for example, by making us tense, by putting a felt load upon our bodily frame or by relieving a tension, making us relax and open up to our surroundings. In this way, an atmosphere might provide some, or most of the emotional quality and dynamics in a given situation, while also leaving room for the agent's idiosyncratic contribution. Accordingly, an atmosphere does not determine entirely the course, quality, or depth of a person's experience, but it may prefigure, temporarily dominate, and guide it, for example, by modifying dimensions of corporeal experience and thus the level of ease or difficulty with which one engages in activities. This also captures the experience that we are sometimes literally "in the grip" of a situation, without much intentional control. The events unfolding around us draw us in, carry us away, make "us" a part of their dynamics, whether we want it or not.

An atmosphere's force consists in its capacity to affect a person's bodily dynamics, for example, in modifying the characteristic weight that usually pertains to the lived body—such as when a joyful atmosphere is literally experienced as uplifting, as suddenly making us willing (and effortlessly able) to jump around. Or take the opposite case—a context of tragic loss, where an atmosphere of sorrow wears on us heavily, and burdens us with a felt load that makes us unable to act. In all these cases, the feeling body is not initially experienced as separate from the world, but rather as in constant dynamic interaction with what goes on in the environment. It is a kind of *in-corporation*—the bodily resonance field has no fixed boundaries, but a constantly shifting shape that may dynamically extend out, depending on what affect-intensive phenomena are currently unfolding around us.

Conclusion

With the lived body construed in this way, with descriptions of the rich expressive dynamics of embodied interaction, and with an understanding of affective atmospheres as dynamic, forceful qualitative and expressive gestalt features in public space, extended emotions begin to look phenomenologically plausible. Given all this, we have good reason to assume that emotions experienced in virtue of an individual's immersion in a collective can be such as to transform her emotionality in fundamental ways, giving rise to emotions different in kind from what she was capable of experiencing before. Of course, the approach outlined in this chapter is different from the conceptual framework of standard EM, but it is capable of endowing it with a much needed descriptive dimension, enabling it to encompass the phenomenal characteristics of emotional experience and inter-affective exchange. The view explored here also shares with EM some important ideas: namely, "tools for feeling" as analogous to EM's "tools for thinking," the important role of an agent's activity in structuring not only her epistemic but also her affective environment, and thus also the acknowledgement of the importance of our deliberate designing of the environment—a kind of *emotional* niche construction—in order to make us experience more and qualitatively different emotions than we would be capable of otherwise.

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